

# THEOLOGY

## A MONTHLY JOURNAL OF HISTORIC CHRISTIANITY

EDITED BY S. C. CARPENTER, D.D.

VOLUME XXX.  
JANUARY—JUNE, 1935

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SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING  
CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE



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A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

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## EDITORIAL

WE do not know what effect Dr. Lyttelton's article in our July number on "Almsgiving and the Church Overseas" has had on the lives of churchpeople, but it must have pricked many consciences. It was an earnest plea for greater simplicity of life, and it led to the plain and irresistible conclusion that those who live simply will have more to give away. There are very few of us who do not know in our hearts that luxury is a corrupting thing. Many of us deliberately allow ourselves a few indulgences. There is at least one monastic house in England where, because the life is hard, the luxury of tobacco is permitted. There are others where a different view is taken, but it will serve as an example. Dr. Lyttelton was severe on the habit of continual cigarette-smoking, and on the habit of pressing cigarettes on friends in the name of hospitality. Pipe-smokers are accustomed to pride themselves on the supposed superiority of their own habit. Like the ungodly in the Psalms, they say, "Our lips are our own; who is lord over us?" (Ps. xii. 4, R.V.). But even so, tobacco now costs about three times what it did in the consulship of Plancus, namely the year 1896. And although Empire tobacco is cheaper over the counter than the oecumenical variety, it does not last so long. Thus the habit is likely to represent a considerable annual expenditure. What is the duty of the pipe-addict? Not without some searchings of heart and fear of being thrasonical, we have no alternative but firmly to reply, "He must not become a slave to it." Then, more happily and more confidently, we add, "And, if he enjoys this or any other luxury, he must work for it. He must not only earn his living, he must earn his luxuries."

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This said, we repeat that luxury is—

the guiled shore

To a most dangerous sea;

The seeming truth which cunning times put on

To entrap the wisest.



Nothing is easier than to persuade yourself that some indulgence is necessary to health, or a social lubricator which cannot be forgone. Nothing is easier (or more pleasant) than to persuade yourself that it is right to entertain up to the maximum scale that anyone is likely to expect. No one can deny that to shew hospitality is a virtue, and it is to be wished that there were much more of it. But in the Gospel the only kind of hospitality either mentioned or intended is apparently that shewn to such as can make no return. To do this is a Christian duty. Can we supplement this at all? What of the practice of entertaining persons who may not but could return the invitation? Is it "a corrupt following of the apostles," or "a state of life allowed in the scriptures"? The frank *Do ut des*, which sets out to earn a recompense, is certainly a vicious principle. But the sense that it is reasonable to give "cutlet for cutlet," even if you do happen to take the initiative with your own, is not necessarily bad. Mutual entertainment is part of the intercourse of equals, and the most convenient sacrament of friendship, whether among equals or unequals, is to break bread together. Nevertheless, it is a dangerous region, and, as always, pride is the chiefest enemy. A great victory would have been achieved if it became recognized that the entertainment offered by Christian people is always on a simple scale. If all Englishmen were to spend a good deal less on the satisfaction of their bodily desires, and all Englishwomen a good deal less on dress, it would be a notable evidence of the conversion of the English people to Christianity.

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In the Middle Ages *the* Christian duty was that of charity. It was commonly supposed that this was in the main discharged by almsgiving. The method was not scientific, and the gains from which something, often a large proportion, was given to the poor, had not always been well gotten. A writer, whose name eludes our memory, remarks in an historical essay, that the robber baron, riding home from a foray, would feel a glow of satisfaction when he heard the vesper bell ringing from the monastery which he had endowed out of the profits of previous forays. He would perhaps reflect that his benefaction brought him, with all his sins, of which he was much more conscious than his modern counterpart is apt to be, nearer to heaven. That was the weakness. Almsgiving was a work by means of which merit was acquired. The real motive is love—love of God, and love for the souls for whom Christ died. That is why Dr. Lyttelton speaks of the Church overseas. Here is the true field for selfless love. Do you desire the glory of God? Do



you desire that the unbaptized, unevangelized peoples of the world shall find their true place in the fulness of Christ's Body? Here then is the great cause. And yet how rare it is to find Christian people, of the laity or of the clergy, who are genuinely on fire for it! There is no doubt a proportion to be observed. There are always the awful warnings of Mrs. Jellyby and Mrs. Pardiggle to be remembered. It is not quite reasonable to complain, as someone once did, that if the clergy really believed the *Quicunque vult*, they would neither eat nor sleep. It is much better to work for eight hours a day for fifty years than twenty-four hours a day for a week. But how is it that we do not care much more than we do? A man has limits to the amount of his caring; he has room for only a certain amount of interest. But we have talents, and they ought to be used. There seems no excuse for spending nearly all the available strength on parochial, or minor, or sectional causes, and only a decent minimum on S.P.G. We need—it is a truism—a revision of our scale of values. But A and B and C also need—and this is much more difficult—to do something which will shew that *their* scale has been revised.

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There is another matter which has a bearing on simplicity of life. That is the vexed question of contraception. The arguments used in favour of a general use of the practice commonly turn on the health of the wife, but the actual motives are often of an economic kind, and would be felt less urgently if simplicity had not been laid aside as an ideal. We have received a useful pamphlet on the subject entitled "Mothers' Welfare," by the Rev. H. A. King, Rector of Holt, Proctor in Convocation (Goose and Son, Norwich. 6d.). Dr. Lyttelton writes a Foreword to it, but it would not in all respects satisfy the League of National Life. Mr. King writes persuasively about Nature and the natural, and of the futility and danger of attempting to decide or even to touch such questions apart from moral and religious considerations. In the main he agrees with Resolution 15 of the Lambeth Conference, not as it has often been interpreted by unthinking or unscrupulous people, but as was intended, and expressed, by the bishops. In the economic sphere he looks forward to the rise of "some up-to-date St. Francis, who will inaugurate an era when it will be among the marks of a gentleman that he is honourably careful how he spends his money, and when people will think it as vulgar to be ashamed of honourable poverty as it is vulgar to be proud of wealth—when plain living and high thinking shall be once more."

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Three Industrial Christian Fellowship publications demand notice. There is a fourth edition of the Crusaders' Handbook, *Christ the Lord of All Life* (I.C.F., 4, The Sanctuary, S.W. 1. 2s.) which impresses both by the solidity of its theological and apologetic teaching and by the shrewdness of the suggestions given to speakers about the handling of those thorny topics where religion touches politics and economics. There are also two pamphlets by the Director, the Rev. P. T. R. Kirk, "The Kingdom of God or the Kingdom of Mammon" and "The Economic Foundations of Peace." We cannot help thinking that the author is rather severe in his analysis of the godless or atheistic basis of modern society, though it may be supposed that he has access to evidence which is not available to most of us. But he has a firm grasp of Christian principles, and a good understanding of that existing financial situation which, whether it is to be improved by ending or mending, must anyhow be understood before it can be improved at all. The system towards which Mr. Kirk looks is one in which "money falls into its right place in the economic system, until it is at the service of the whole community, instead of being used, as it is to-day, as a commodity in itself, being lent out where it will secure the highest interest." Or again, "a system where money is cheap and human beings are dear; where money has no value apart from its purchasing power; it must be the servant of all human activities: not the master; it is a tool, not a commodity." In this connection, our readers will be interested to hear that we have just received an article from Dr. Bernard Iddings Bell, of Providence, Rhode Island, on "Economic Morality and the Individual," in which an attempt is made to read the new situation aright. We hope to print it before long.

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The work of the Hebrew Guild of Intercession in connection with the East London Fund for the Jews is much to be commended. The Fund has for its Chairman the Bishop of Stepney and for its director the Reverend Dr. Paul Levertoff, and the work is on wise, true lines. The services of the Guild are commonly conducted at Holy Trinity Church, Shoreditch, and on the Saturday before Advent Sunday the congregation at St. George's, Bloomsbury, had what probably was to all of them, and certainly was to one, a very moving experience. They assisted at a Christian Eucharist in the Hebrew language. It was not merely in the Hebrew language. It was a Hebrew Liturgy, compiled by Dr. Levertoff, and known as the Order of Service of the Meal of the Holy King (33, Bedford Square, W.C. 1, or 5, Mansfield Road, Ilford. 1s.). It has Hebrew and



English on opposite pages. Learned scholars (Dr. Oesterley, Dr. Nairne, Dr. Cooke) testify that it is made from early Jewish and Christian liturgical sources; it contains the essentials of the Christian Eucharist: it is reverent, and, as sung with the haunting lilt of Hebrew melodies, it is exquisitely beautiful. The underlying idea of the whole work is that of St. Paul, nay, that of our Lord Himself, Who came not to destroy, but to fulfil. There have been times when the Church has so presented the Gospel to non-Christian hearers as to seem to require repudiation of old loyalties. The wise Christian missionary follows the method of St. Paul at Athens. How much more when the approach is not to heathen, but to an ancient, holy people, whose are the covenants and the promises, and of whom according to the flesh Christ came, Who is over all. One worshipper in St. George's Church, who had often thought on those lines, but had never seen the work nor helped in it, said to himself, "Everything that I believed is true."

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## RUSSIAN CHRISTIANITY

THE Divine Revelation is not the mechanical dictation from heaven to men of the "unspeakable words" of God. The Apostle Paul has told us that he was thought fit to be caught up into paradise and to hear there "unspeakable words," but it was not possible to utter them direct to man (2 Cor. xii. 4). The Divine words are apprehended in accordance with the inspiration of the Holy Spirit with varying degrees of clearness and perfection by the prophets and by every believing soul. In a variety of ways they are embodied in the spoken and written word as well as in religious ordinance. The subjective prism of the human spirit, refracting in different forms in diverse persons, peoples and times the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, confers on the Divine Revelation human flesh and blood. Man's divinely inspired comprehension of Divine Revelation inevitably includes therewith certain relative features connected with language, culture, nationality, with physical symbols. Thus are formed various types of understanding and experiencing Christianity: the Christianity of Greece, of Rome, of the East, of the West. In this series there is also a Russian Christianity. And this is both legitimate and normal. It is not an excrescence or slag requiring careful removal from the pure core of the Divine Revelation; it is the priceless jewel of faith. In its concreteness it is not given to us to possess absolutely the Divine form of truth. There is given to us concretely only its Divine-human form, its "absolute-relative" form. For the Christian this is not a paradox, but the sacred antinomy of the Chalcedonian dogma which saves us from the opposite heresies of an unbelieving folk-lore (Nestorianism) or a pseudo-Christian spiritualism (Monophysitism).

Certainly, in these questions there is a certain sensible limit, beyond which already begins the specific sphere of positivist folk-lore. But to the believing eye is revealed another, a spiritual limit, beyond which the relative facts of folk-lore become the symbols and reflections of Divine truths and forces. The "Word of God" has sounded and sounds, not only in Hebrew and Greek, but in Latin and German and Slavonic and in all the languages of the earth, kaleidoscopically refracting in them and in the souls of different cultures the secrets of revelation.

When the question is put to me, Have the Russian people and the Russian Church their own characteristic experience



and understanding of Christianity? without hesitation I reply: Yes, they have; and, moreover, not just as a curiosity of folklore and not as a deviation from the œcumenical truth of the Church, but as an enrichment of œcumenical truth by original experience. I will try to depict certain characteristic features of Russian Christianity without complicating matters with the detailed arguments at my disposal.

As with other peoples, the Russian racial and national temperament is the product of a very long history. It was compacted while yet in prehistoric times. Already in the dawn of Russian history, in the eighth and ninth centuries, still before the baptism of the Russian people, in fragmentary observations on their character by Byzantine and Arab writers, we may note in our mixed Slavonic, Norman, Finnish and Turkish ancestors a love and a tendency to go to opposite extremes, the tragic "breadth" of the Russian character, famous in Russian literature, which frightened Dostoevsky, himself its singer. "The Russian is broad," he wrote. "I would like to narrow him." It is an elementality and passion unrestrained by sufficient will and discipline. Probably it is a question here not just of the celebrated "Slav soul," but of its singular mixture with the Turkish and Finnish soul. However that may be, such a people meeting Christianity could hardly adopt towards it an attitude too moderate and restrained; it could not be, in the vivid phrase of the Apocalypse, "neither cold nor hot" (Rev. iii. 15). It responded to Christianity with hot ardour, at first with gibes and hatred as of some folly, some "holy madness" (in the ninth century in the time of the turbulent prince Svyatoslav), then later with the enthusiasm of renunciation (with the foundation in the eleventh century of the Pechersky Monastery at Kiev) as to the joyful, ascetic conquest of the heavenly Jerusalem. The unbridled pagan savage, who had surrendered himself elementally and without will to orgiastic drunkenness and debauchery, was shaken to the depth of his soul by the discovery that there is another ideal, a life almost bodiless, almost angelic, and that there are men-heroes who can live so. With some Iranian, dualistic acuity the ancient Russian felt the bestiality and filth of his life in the flesh, and was drawn to a life bright and pure, which would liberate him from the uncleanness of the flesh, a heavenly life, "isangelic"; that is, the ascetic, monastic life. The neophyte, yesterday's pagan, as the chronicle of the Pechersky Monastery shews, surrendered himself to the most daring ascetic feats: burying himself to the throat in the earth, eating only raw herbs, immuring himself in dark and damp underground caves, submitting his body to be eaten by marsh mosquitoes, and so on.



This was, certainly, the heroic minority of the newly converted Christians. But the remaining mass of people, living in worldly circumstance, paid rapturous homage to these heroes of the faith in Christ; recognized them, as it were, as the sole real Christians, as the redeemers of all the laity with their sinful, worldly, pagan life, which could not lead to salvation. Spiritual fathers had to comfort and support their spiritual children in their worldly condition, and these strove to cast all aside and become monks. The work of a prince, service to the state and society, trade, husbandry—all worldly pursuits—seemed to them obstacles to the salvation of the soul. At the very least before death pious Russians hastened to take the monastic tonsure in order to stand before the Heavenly Judge as “real Christians.” Christianity was understood as asceticism in the form of renouncing the world, of monkhood. This it is to bear the cross of Christ; this the martyrdom, the “suffering,” that leads to paradise.

Memories of the early Christian period of martyrdom for Christ, characteristically strong in Eastern Christianity, found a particularly sensitive response in the Slavonic and Russian soul. The Greek language of the Gospels (Acts i. 8) and the Roman law designated fidelity to the Gospel as “testimony.” But what cut the Slav to the quick in the “witnesses” was their physical pain, their “suffering.” The Slav registered in his word for martyr, *muchenik*, the sentimental moment, the endurance of mortification, torture, suffering, *muka*. So the suffering Christ appeared before the Russian heart as the First Martyr-*Muchenik*. Likewise, all His followers must be martyrs in the flesh, mortifiers of self, ascetics. The ascetic rule and cult are as far as possible conveyed from the monastery into family, domestic and private life, albeit in symbol. According to opportunity, the style of monastic piety is communicated to all sides of daily life in the home as a sweet odour in the evil-smelling cares of this life. With prayer to rise in the morning, with prayer to lie down at night, with prayer to begin and to end every act, feeding and drinking—in this way was founded the *Domostroy*, the Home-Rule, the ordering of family life in the spirit of the monastic rule.

But home and family are none the less too worldly, too sinful a place for man to be raised there in soul to heaven. The real heaven on earth is the monastery, where all is prayer, all is worship, all is splendour and spiritual beauty. The soul thirsts for this holy “sabbath” in order to rest for a moment from the galling pain of sin and worldly care. Then to the monastery, to the monastery! For a day, for a week, for more! There is fasting, confession and communion there,



a spiritual bath that cleanses away the dirt of the world. To him who has once tasted this sweetness, to him who has been "a guest with God," it is tempting to prolong this enjoyment, to repeat it.

Here we meet another variant of the same ascetic piety, with the practice of pilgrimages to monasteries and sacred spots. This so pleased the newly converted Russians that already in the eleventh century we see them in crowds going the round of the monasteries in Athos, Greece and Palestine. In the twelfth century the Russian hierarchs issued even restrictive and prohibitory rules against the abuse of pilgrimages: so many people had been taken from work at great loss to the state and the national economy. But with the growth of native Russian monasteries pilgrimages grew uninterruptedly. At all times of the year, but pre-eminently in spring and summer, pilgrims poured in their thousands and tens of thousands from the Carpathian Mountains, from the Pochaevsky Monastery, by way of the Pechersky Monastery in Kiev and the Trinity Monastery of St. Sergius near Moscow to the Monastery of Solovki in the White Sea and back again. Some cut across old Russia in other directions, from the Pechersky Monastery at Pskov in the west, to the relics of St. Innocent in Irkutsk near Lake Baikal. At a time when the secularly-minded Russian intellectuals knew only one direction for their travels, to the West, to Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and scarcely saw the Christian and Biblical East, the popular peasant masses, in number from fifteen to thirty thousand a year, visited the holy places, Tsargrad, Athos, Palestine, Sinai, Bari with the relics of St. Nicholas the Wonder-Worker. All this was arranged exceptionally cheaply and conveniently by the Russian Church Mission and the Imperial Palestine Society. And even now, when, because of the iron fetters of Bolshevism which bind the Russian people, not a single soul from the people can break forth to freedom and breathe the free air of the holy places of Palestine, there in the orphaned homes of Russia hundreds of old pilgrims sadly live out their lives.

To the mass of pilgrims to monasteries there was added a whole wandering army of collectors for the building of churches, of monks collecting in aid of the monasteries themselves, and a host of poor brethren who sang sacred verse. The result was the so-called "Vagrant Russia," to which was also contributed an element not religious, an element of simple tramps. Certainly all this was the heritage of the prehistoric nomadic wandering of the tribes through the wide Russian plain, which has remained in the Russian blood and has been transformed in the Russian soul into dreaminess and the quest



of the "new city," Jerusalem descending from on high. The expectation of the end of history with the second coming of the Son of Man, which has been preserved from Apostolic times and is characteristic of Eastern Christianity, has found in this "wandering" Russian heart the highest response. If any Christian nation has feelingly and joyfully received the Apostle's words: "We have not here an abiding city, but seek after that which is to come" (Heb. xiii. 14), it is the Russians. Many facts could be adduced in this spirit from the sphere of Russian religious life both in the Church and in the sects. Even the secular ideology of the Russian intelligentsia is full of this impulse towards the catastrophic end of history and to the welcome of some new world. It is noteworthy that prehistoric anthropology finds traces of the catastrophic disappearance of two races that once inhabited the Russian plain. The pitiless destruction by the Bolsheviks of the historical and spiritual inheritance of Russian culture, as it were, reflects this usedness to catastrophe. Nowhere, particularly in the West, has Christian eschatology been so near, so native to Christian piety as in Russia. In comparison with the spirit of Russian eschatology the teachings of Karl Barth appear a belated and far-fetched conception. To soar lightly over the heavy inertia of historic positivism is the most archaic, early-Christian trait in Russian religion. The Russians are the modern Thessalonians, children of Paul.

But not only in monasteries and in pilgrimages does the Russian seek to raise his soul to God. Nearest of all for him is his parish church. This is his most ready path to heaven; it is a piece of heaven. The very exterior of the church, compared with the dwelling of the Russian peasant, already speaks of heaven. Amid the often pitiful cabins, wooden, dark and thatched with straw, recalling the habitations of primitive man, there shines in whiteness the church, usually built of stone, whitewashed, tall; if possible, of a fanciful architecture, with high cupolas and gilded crosses, while from its belfry ring merrily peals and triple peals. A single glance cast by the peasant on his church already raises his spirit and liberates him from "the power of the dark earth," in which he is fated to delve all his life. At this, therefore, he is used to remove his cap and cross himself. There he finds light, radiance, gilding, silver, brocade, precious stones, a multitude of lamps, candles, lustres. There everything is unlike the luxury of the world, there is no lace, no flowers—these are too worldly. There are only special "sacred" materials there, "sacred" pictures and colours, "sacred" odours, "sacred" melodies and voices. Let nothing recall to mind what is earthly! The Russian suffers pain in church from the poverty or the insufficiency of the icons; he is



satisfied only with a church completely covered with wall paintings and hung with icons, not to speak of the iconostasis. He wishes every spot of the church walls to speak of heaven; he wishes to be completely surrounded by Cherubim and Seraphim and all the company of heaven, Patriarchs, Prophets, Apostles, Martyrs and All Saints. The Russian does not like to approach God in solitary state; this seems to him a false heroism and pride. Surrounded visibly by the choirs of the saints, he joyfully feels how many there are in heaven of his "kinsmen in the flesh," how unable he is to despair of salvation, how boldly in their "human" company he may be "a guest with God." The Russian does not think abstractly, but in images, plastically. He is an artist, an æsthete, even in religion. The icon has acquired in his eyes a special significance; it is the easiest way to make visible the invisible Church. And it is not surprising that the Oriental-Greek icon, which is in itself a high artistic creation, should have found precisely in Russia, in the schools of Novgorod and Moscow (fourteenth to fifteenth centuries), and even the Stroganov school (seventeenth century), such perfection and elevation as seem almost the limits of iconography. To the great Byzantine heritage ancient Rus added the style and the refined technique of Chinese and Persian art, which was transmitted to the Russian "zographers" by the court painters of the khans of the Golden Horde. The result is the creative achievement, the mystical charm of the Russian icon, in the words of Prince Eugene Trubetskoy a "theology in paint."

As a Slav, a natural artist and singer, the Russian has put into his church singing so much art and strength as to give it, like the icon, both in original and in execution, the world's first place. In the power and majestic sounds of his bells he has excelled all. In the beauty and magnificence of Divine ceremonies there is no equal to the Russian style. With the Russian the maximum of his pathos is undoubtedly in the piety of the temple and of the cult. A particle of this Divine beauty he tries to transmit from the church to his home. In the old Russia practically every well-to-do person had his own domestic chapel. Each peasant has his "red corner" full of icons, "red" in the old language meaning "beautiful," "Sunday-best." Every visitor to the house will make three bows with the sign of the cross to the icons, and only after that will he, in the way of the world, exchange greetings with his hosts.

For a thousand years of long winter snows and autumn rains the Church, with all the charm of her beauty, was the sun that shone and warmed and gave life to the poor, melancholy villages of the north. For not more than a century has the national



soul begun systematically to feed on schools, books, spectacles and certain of the arts! For 1,000 years the single light and joy, the one and only culture of the Russian people, has been their Church. For that they love her. She spake almost their own tongue; for that reason she was to the people a school of knowledge and especially of theology. The churches which gave a Latin Bible and a Latin liturgy were obliged to make special efforts to teach their people the Catechism. The Russian people learnt directly from readings in church and from the singing at the services. The very literary language remained all the time close to the language of the Church.

The Russian, who had put so much of his soul into the piety of the cult, could not be negligent and inattentive when in the seventeenth century the Government of the Tsar Alexis and the Patriarch Nikon betook themselves tactlessly to correct the service-books and rites. Then the best souls, those that were most jealous and fiery in their piety, fell away from the official Church and began, to the sorrow of Russia, the schism of Old Ritualism (Old Belief). Never in the history of Christianity has been observed such a phenomenon as a schism over ceremonies, neither in churches of high cultural level nor in churches of low level such as certain heretic churches of the East. What is this, then? The shame of the Russian people, the lowest pagan form of Christianity? Not at all! This is simply an incomparable, a mathematically incommensurate, form of experiencing Christian revelation, a special mysticism which other peoples do not know. From the very beginning of Russian Christianity we observe in the Russians an unusual, meticulous, superstitious attachment to a once accepted liturgical expression or rite. Our teachers, the Greeks, taught us much, and we obediently received, for example, a bitter and, to us, essentially alien enmity towards Latinism. But "ritual-belief" they could not teach us because in this connection they were and remain compared with us great liberals. The Greek attitude towards the sanctity of the temple seemed to Russian pilgrims in the Orthodox East sheer carelessness and sin. The Russians shewed themselves particularly sensitive to the well-known fact of religious psychology that objects of all kinds, words, forms and traditions, taken into church use, acquire a specially sacred meaning from contact with the absolute, Divine essence of the Church and elicit in the believer a particular pious heedfulness. Everything, even physical details, metals, materials, sketches, that has come into church use acquires a deposit of eternity, becomes, as it were, eternalized, just as plants and flowers thrown into the hot spring at Karlsbad, the Sprudel, are petrified, turned into stone. Theoretically, we



encounter rationally in this fact the great, incomprehensible, antinomic problem of philosophy, dogmatics and mysticism; the contact of the Infinite and the finite, of God and the creature. This is a problem which typically divides the mental dispositions of East and West, as was shewn by the last original flash of Greek metaphysics in the fourteenth century at the time of the so-called Hesychastic disputes. The West stood by Thomas Aquinas and Barlaam of Calabria, but the East by Gregory Palama, the Bishop of Thessalonica. The latter was even canonized for his metaphysical achievements. In Russian religious experience has been disclosed the most decisive and adequate justification of the Hesychast theology. According to the theology of Gregory Palama, if God in His pure essence is not contained in creature persons or things, He is really and substantively communicated to them and present in them in His "energies," His effective acts; and things and persons thought worthy, in grace-endued, ascetic travail, of this indwelling of God in them are themselves thereby made Divine (*theosis*). The Church is the treasure-house of countless "energies" of God, of "Divine" objects—Prophets, Saints, the Sacraments, the words of Holy Writ and church prayers, the very names of God, miracles, miraculous icons and relics, all consecrated things—all these are the vessels of Godhead itself. Alone of the peoples baptized by the Greeks have the Russian people apprehended with this strength, as it were, the physically tangible presence of God in things, created, material, but by the consecration of the Church transfigured in grace. The Russian in church feels at each point radiating around, as it were, the electrical currents of Divine power and holiness; he is physically moved by them. The ruling hierarchy of the Russian Church have themselves made fatal mistakes in this respect, since they were themselves in a strong degree infected with Western rationalism through textbooks borrowed from the West. So it was in the seventeenth century, when was formed the grievous schism of Old Ritualism (Old Belief). So it was quite recently, in 1912-13, before our own eyes, when a group of Russian monks at Athos, continuing exactly the tradition of the Hesychasts, proclaimed that "the Name of God is God Himself." But from shortcomings of education and polemical zeal they, like the Old Believers of the seventeenth century, coarsened the understanding of this thesis, and this gave the Church authorities the occasion to gain a cheap external victory over them. But free, unofficial Russian theology has risen in defence of these so-called *Imyaslavtsy*, "glorifiers of the Name of God." The famous religious philosopher Vladimir Solovyov, in the course of this Eastern thought



has used the term "theomaterialism"; we shall not alarm Western thought with this fanciful term, but we shall assert that innate in the pious Russian is a particularly keen sense of God in matter. But this has nothing in common with pantheism; on the contrary, it excludes all pantheism, every physical, automatic omnipresence (*ubiquitas*). The Divine "energies" dwell only in souls and things endued with grace; all others, that have not attained grace by the path of spiritual exercise or the Church's consecration, often are not even neutral, but serve as the vessels of an unclean, atheistic power, the weapons of evil spirits. This is not pantheism as something granted, but pan-en-theism as an obligation. It is the task of Christians and the Church to gather together "all in God," and by pious travail to prepare the way "that God may be all in all" (1 Cor. xv. 28). In this living sense of the habitation of God in earthly sanctuaries, and not, as it has been depicted by the irreligious, in an elementary ignorance or pagan superstition, is the root of Russian ritual-belief, Old Ritualism. Certainly a deficiency of scientific education confused the ceremonial disputes of the seventeenth century; but their substance lay, not in grammatical or archaeological arguments, but in the mysticism and theurgic nature of piety in the Russian cult. To touch the once established forms of Divine service was intolerably painful; it was felt as a violation of sanctity.

Thirsting with all his soul to bring the heavenly Jerusalem to earth, that all his earthly life in winning his daily bread, in making his home, in family, in work, in public affairs, might be sanctified and blessed by the prayers of the Church, the Russian Christian came gradually to see in the ordering of his country's life, in the foundation in her of a great body politic, crowned with light from the crosses on her multitudinous churches, the embodiment of Christ's Kingdom on earth, and named his country "Holy Russia." The number of the saints, of holy places, of miraculous icons, of relics, of wonders, of ascetics, of the pious, represented itself to him as increasing and accumulating in Holy Russia, so that all her stones and the timbers of her buildings were consecrated, prayed over, transfigured with grace, amid the remaining, less sacred, less clean world, perishing in ritual carelessness.

How, then, on the basis of this religious psychology, which recalls us to the Old Testament mysticism of Levite ritual purity, did the Russian soul experience the fundamental dogmas of Christianity—her relation to our Saviour, the evangelical consciousness of sonship in God, grace and freedom, and the first "royal" commandments of love to God and to neighbour?

There is one noteworthy fact. Greek theological contem-



plation of St. Sophia as the particular image of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity found its liturgical expression in the consecration of several cathedrals to St. Sophia. In imitation of the Greeks there appeared in Russia also churches of St. Sophia. But their patronal celebrations were timed for the festivals in honour of Theotokos, and St. Sophia was interpreted, partly also in iconographic treatment, as the image of the Mother of God. Miraculous and honoured icons of the Mother of God are numbered in Russia by dozens and her churches by hundreds. The favourite services and *acathisti* of the Russian people are particularly the services of Theotokos. They dedicated the national cathedrals in their capitals to the Mother of God: the Desyatinny Cathedral at Kiev, the Cathedrals of the Assumption at Vladimir and Moscow, the Kazan Cathedral at Petersburg. What is this? Forgetfulness of Christ, the disfigurement of dogma? In no wise. This is only the unique refraction of the dogma of the Redemption in the national soul. An historical and idyllic relation to the past is quite foreign to the Russian consciousness; not Renan, not Strauss, not a single positivist German *Leben-Jesu* could arise in a Russian head. Contemplation is turned from the past to the future. For us Christ will come with glory to judge the quick and the dead. Customary in Russia is the Greek iconographic figure of the *Pantocrator*, the Lord Almighty, Christ the King and Judge. In his ascetic self-condemnation the Russian does not dare simply to appear before the Just Judge; he seeks a defender. In sinful experience he knows that there is one natural love that forgives all, that is limitlessly merciful, maternal love. As this mother of weak, sinful human kind he recognizes the Mother of God, whose soul was pierced with suffering for the Son of Man and all human grief (Luke ii. 35). Sympathetically and lovingly she covers "with her virtuous veil" the unhappy and repentant sinner, and at the righteous judgment-seat of God saves him from merited punishment. Theotokos is not, and never will be, depicted on icons as a young virgin alone, without the child, except only on the icons of the Annunciation and of the Presentation of the Virgin in the Temple, where, of necessity, she must be; she is seen only as the mother with the child. She is also shewn as a mature woman on the threshold of old age, an "elder-woman," with infinite grief in her face for all human kind. In this sense of maternal protection the Russian repeats often in humble prayer the Eastern formula: "O Holy Mother of God, save us!" And, considered in the manner of folk-lore, it might be said that this is not the religion of Christ, but of the Mother of God—inaccurately, however, and at root quite untruly.



With all the Eastern Church Russian Christianity is completely uninterested in the theoretical question of freedom and grace which is so painful for the West. The question seems artificial, even un-Christian, put, as it were, with pagan pride. The question is for the Russian religious consciousness already settled psychologically as being self-evident. Alien in general to the Eastern consciousness is the claim of any person whatever to pay off accounts with God, to make any reckoning of his own powers. It did not need the searchings of Augustine, the pains of Luther, and the heroism of Calvin, in order to learn the whole depth of St. Paul's revelation about salvation only by grace, freely given for faith. With his own shade of meaning and in his own psychological language the Russian designates this grace as "mercy," "the merciful love of God," won for all by the sufferings of the First Martyr, Jesus Christ.

Placed before the question of love towards God and neighbour, the Russian soul feels yet again the danger of some sinful pride. She scarcely dare reflect that it is "she" loves God; on the contrary, she likes to think, she firmly knows, she is infinitely comforted with tears of joy for the knowledge that "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son" for the unworthy, the sinful, the accursed. "God is love": these words of the beloved disciple enchanted the Russian soul; not our love for God, but God's love for us interests her. This love is so infinite and so almighty that even the mysterious questions of eternal punishment and the devil, without reference to the opinions of Origen, without heretical discord, intimately, esoterically, are decided in the sense of universal *apocatastasis* (1 Cor. xv. 28), the final salvation of all in the bosom of the Father's love.

Our love towards God is conceived as the natural responsive echo to this infinite gift of God's love to us. But love for one's neighbour? To our neighbour also, not in the spirit of the strong helping the weak, but in the spirit of the equally strengthless, insignificant sinner, sympathizing with his suffering brother. A love humble and compassionate.

At this point we must underline a fresh peculiarity of the Russian religious consciousness. In it the first place is taken, not by the royal virtue of love, but by the virtue of humility, precisely as in the manuals of the Eastern ascetics. Not because this was read out of them; this, too, was a natural psychological fact, which was only confirmed by the reading of the works of the hermits. In this the ascetic consciousness of one's own uncleanness before God's holiness is combined with the moral and ontological nothingness of the creature before the Creator. The simple Russian monk says to the layman: "Remember,



God created the world out of nothing; do thou, too, feel to the uttermost that thou art nothing before Him—then only will He begin to make something of thee." Absolute humility is the beginning, the foundation of the Christian way.

Humility leads to another virtue beloved of the Russian soul, to patience under suffering. The historical memory of the Russian people is full of the sufferings which they have endured. That life is suffering is a thought very near to Russian experience and Russian attention. The idea of co-suffering attracts the Russian heart in the Gospel. Christ is conceived as the Lamb condemned to be slain (John i. 29), as the Suffering Servant of Jehovah in the Book of Isaiah (liii.), he that took the form of a servant (Phil. ii. 7), the First Martyr, humble and meek in suffering. Bearing the cross for Him, co-martyrdom with Him, and co-suffering in the name of Christ with all suffering brethren, are to the Russian soul an adequate form of love for one's neighbour. This is not an active humanitarian form of philanthropy; it is the sympathetic sharing with the suffering brother of his cross of patience.

At the same time Russian Christianity is not "the Christianity of Golgotha"; its climax is the jubilant celebration of Easter. Not to Golgotha, but to the Resurrection of Christ is given the decisive significance by the Eastern, and in particular the Russian soul. The Nativity of Christ does not call forth quite this fullness of joy; in the future are still the sufferings of life and Golgotha. Only with Easter comes cloudless jubilation. Then the Russian soul, longing for the transfiguration of the earthly into the heavenly, has a genuine foretaste of that transfiguration in an unusually joyful ecstasy. The spiritual and physical rejoicing in the services and in the souls of believers on that holy night is so exceptional, so marvellous, that it exceeds the joy of the other sacraments: it has been interpreted by an eminent Russian hierarch as in fact a sacrament, as a special vehicle of grace. And to the Russian this interpretation is understandable. The writer Gogol has prophesied that the moment will come when the Resurrection is celebrated on Russian soil as nowhere else.

(Tr. A. F. D-B.)

ANTON KARTASHOV.



## THREE MODERN APPROACHES TO GOD

A DISCUSSION OF THE THEISM OF PROFESSOR A. N. WHITE-  
HEAD, DR. F. R. TENNANT AND PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR

"The proper study of mankind is"—God.

### I

#### INTRODUCTION

THE two questions "What is God like?" and "Is there a God?" are so closely related that it is impossible helpfully to discuss one of them without also examining the other, for until we have provided ourselves with some definition of God, we cannot enquire whether a being answering to this description exists, and, on the other hand, it will be found that, in practice, the arguments by which the existence of God may be claimed to be established will themselves make explicit, at any rate to some degree, the content and consequences of the definition.

The first part of our enquiry will thus be devoted to formulating exactly what the term "God" is to stand for. At first sight it may seem a waste of time to spend very long over this, for it might be urged that, provided we have *some* definition of God, no matter what, we can always proceed to ask whether God as so defined exists. From a purely academic standpoint this may be allowed, but, from the standpoint of one who has some interest in practical religion, a preliminary discussion of the meaning to be assigned to the term "God" is vitally important. For the chief reason why a Christian should wish to examine the arguments for the existence of God is in order to answer the question, whether raised by himself or by others, "Is the Christian religion *as actually practised by me* based on any sound rational foundation or not?" We shall therefore first of all ask what definition of God will correspond to the Being whom Christians rightly or wrongly believe to exist and to have the sovereign claim on their allegiance, and we can then proceed to the second part of our enquiry and enquire what reasons can be adduced for supposing that such a Being exists.

This may seem to be a very obvious method of approach, but it is as a matter of fact very often ignored, and its neglect is the cause of much unsatisfactory theological writing at the present day. It is still rather unfashionable to avow oneself an atheist, at any rate in English-speaking countries; there is



therefore a temptation to those who do not believe in the God of traditional Christian theology to apply the word "God" to whatever entity or influence or principle they may suppose to underlie the phenomenal world. Mr. Bertrand Russell is to some extent correct when he says that "theologians have grown grateful for small mercies, and they do not much care what sort of God the man of science gives them, so long as he gives them one at all."\* "The 'theology,'" says Professor N. P. Williams, "which is taught in the now undenominationalised faculties of modern universities . . . is not so much the 'science of God' as the 'science of men's thoughts about God'; and 'theology' interpreted in that classical and 'systematic' significance which in olden days won for her the proud title of 'the Queen of Sciences' must be content to find a home in seminaries and other specifically ecclesiastical institutions."† That this is so is nothing less than a calamity, for it means that man's conception of the Supreme Being is going to change with every fashion of thought. The subjectivism which is so prominent a feature of modern thought and action has infected the sphere of theology. Mr. R. Ellis Roberts, in a brilliant essay on *The Confusion in Literature*, has observed that "most of what is wrong with modern art . . . can be attributed to two main tendencies, the supersession of philosophy by psychology and the substitution of individualism for authority,"‡ and what he finds in the realm of art is very largely true in the realm of theology too. Like the Member of Parliament in a well-known story, "we all of us believe in some sort of a something somewhere," and proceed to enquire (if indeed we proceed to do anything at all) what this something is like. The traditional approach of Christian philosophy, on the other hand, has been first to formulate the Christian conception of God, and then to enquire whether God exists. In other words, the traditional attitude has considered the main empirical problem to be that of the *existence* of God; what we may call the "modern" attitude considers that the main empirical problem is that of His *nature*.

This is more than just a methodological difference. It touches the very heart of the Christian life, for while the traditional approach judges man by the measure of God, the "modern" approach at least tends to judge God by the measure of man. The famous Aberdonian epitaph—

" Here lie I, Martin Elginbrodde:  
Ha'e mercy o' my soul, Lord God,  
As I would do, were I Lord God  
And ye were Martin Elginbrodde "—

\* *The Scientific Outlook*, p. 115.

† *Christianity and the Crisis*, p. 72.

‡ *Northern Catholicism*, p. 131.



puts in a nutshell the anthropocentrism of this type of thought. "Elginbroddianism" is perhaps as good a name as could be found to designate it. How different is the ejaculation attributed to St. Augustine: "O my God, if I were God and Thou Augustine, I would wish that Thou wert God and I Augustine"!

There are, it is true, signs of attempts to meet this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The Humanism of Professor Irving Babbitt and his school is an attempt to restore the traditional attitude of worship without accepting the traditional Christian metaphysic. It falls under the same condemnation as the Roman Catholic modernism of the Le Roy-Tyrrell school, that no system which is purely pragmatic can survive the great moral and spiritual crises of life. If my religion is only an attitude to the Universe that I have chosen, it can hardly survive the storms of temptation or the droughts of spiritual aridity. Only the utter conviction that its ultimate authority is that of a supreme order outside and above myself can enable my religion to stand when its joys cease to be felt. Humanism and Modernism (in the Roman Catholic sense) fail in the desolation when the soul cries *Deus meus, quare dereliquisti?* Only the conviction of the complete and supreme objectivity of God can lead it on to the triumphant *Consummatum est!* and the lovingly trustful *In manus tuas commendo spiritum meum*. Professor Babbitt has himself admitted that "the problem of the humanist is to discover some equivalent for grace,"\* and Mr. T. S. Eliot is undoubtedly right when he affirms that Mr. Babbitt, in thinking "that the 'outer' restraints of an orthodox religion, as they weaken, can be supplied by the inner restraint of the individual over himself," is "trying to build a Catholic platform out of Protestant planks."† One feels the same pathos in reading Mr. Lippmann's *Preface to Morals*. There is the same longing for the Christian God and for grace, and the same hopeless attempt to find a substitute for them. Mr. Lippmann sings, perhaps more beautifully than anyone else, the swan-song of religious Pragmatism.

A far more important, if not more symptomatic, attempt to deal with this emergency is seen in the extraordinary phenomenon of the Barth and Br  nner school. The reaction from the coldly intellectual Liberal Protestantism of Germany was of course heralded by the eschatologism of Schweitzer, but it is in the theology of crisis that its apex is reached. The criticism levelled at Liberal Protestantism by Catholicism was that it was nothing but a bare intellectualism; the criticism that Catholicism has to bring against Barthianism is that it is not

\* Quoted by C. E. Hudson in THEOLOGY, February, 1934.

† "The Humanism of Irving Babbitt" in *Selected Essays*, p. 424.



intellectualist enough. The objection to a purely immanent God is that He can say nothing to man about Himself, but there is an equally strong objection to a purely transcendent God, namely, that man can say nothing about Him; and it can be safely prophesied that, unless Barthianism can associate itself with a sound rational theology, it will remain as an interesting example of an extreme reaction against the anthropocentrism of the past, but will fail to have any permanent result, except, perhaps, in the lives of a few mystical esoterics. It is nevertheless of great significance as a sign of the times.

A far more important movement, intellectually considered, is the present-day Roman Catholic Neo-scholasticism. Only a few years back Scholasticism was generally looked upon as a medieval relic confined to seminaries and unworthy of serious attention. It has recently taken its place as making a definite challenge to the thinking world. Its worst enemies would have to admit that it was profoundly rational, indeed some of them would perhaps allege that it was too much so; but its principal failing would seem to be that it is too much a restatement of St. Thomas's arguments and too little a re-application of his methods. This seems to be particularly true in the case of M. Maritain, who has been not inaptly described as *homo unius libri*, and that *liber* the *Summa* of St. Thomas. A far more constructive modern exposition of Scholasticism has been given by M. Gilson, whose Gifford Lectures on *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale* are as critical as one could desire. Exposition, even critical exposition, is not, however, everything; defence is needed as well. Much water has flowed down the Seine since the Angelic Doctor taught in the University of Paris, and still more down the rivers of Germany; and there are other Gentiles from whose attacks the Faith needs defending besides Averroës and Avicenna. In plain language, Scholasticism cannot be restored simply by restating it. The works of the post-Reformation idealists and of the modern scientific-philosophical school have to be examined, sifted, and applied in a constructive way if the reaction to St. Thomas is to make good its ground.

This has been a digression, though not an entirely useless one if it has made it clear that there are definite movements back from the anthropocentrism and subjectivism of recent philosophical theology towards the theocentrism and objectivism which have characterised the great Christian systems of the past. We must now try to answer the question by which this digression was suggested—What conception of God does the Christian religion demand?

"Religion," wrote Baron von Hügel in a never-to-be-for-



gotten phrase, "is adoration." It is when the Christian is prostrate before the glory of the uncreated Godhead that he believes himself to be exercising his highest function and fulfilling the supreme end of his existence. When we ask what Reality could be the adequate object of such an act, there can be no other answer than that it must be a Being such that the mind cannot tolerate the notion that any greater could have the possibility of existence, concrete or conceptual or even logical. It would be, for the worshipping Christian, an impossibility if he were asked to conceive the existence of a Being greater in any respect than that which he believes himself to be worshipping. His God is, in fact, the *aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest* of St. Anselm; if, after all, there is nothing in reality corresponding to this concept, then the Christian life is based on an utter and tragic mistake, and the whole structure of Catholic devotion falls to the ground. The Catholic, if he is convinced that no such Being exists, will not say that God is evidently not so great as he thought; he will say quite simply that after all there is no God. *Dicet in corde suo, non est Deus.* God may or may not exist, but the Catholic will either believe in the God who is literally that than which no greater can be thought, or he will cease to claim that, in any sense in which he is interested in the word, there is a God at all. *Aut Deus aut nihil* will be his motto; whether God exists or not, His glory He will not give to another. To adore any being less than one who comprises in Himself all possible perfection would be to the Catholic simply a kind of conceptual idolatry. The point at issue is well brought out in the dialogue of St. Augustine with Evodius, which Fr. M. C. D'Arcy quotes in his essay on *The Philosophy of St. Augustine*.\* "If," the Saint says to Evodius, "we can find something indubitably superior to our reason, would you hesitate to call that, whatever it be, God?" And the answer of Evodius, with which Augustine agrees, is "I would not straightway . . . call that God. For it is not one to whom my reason is inferior whom I would call God, but one who has no superior"—and, we may surely add, no superior, not merely in concrete fact, but in the whole realm of metaphysical possibility. It is the *quo majus nihil cogitari potest*, that than which nothing greater can be thought, that, as St. Anselm and St. Thomas† both saw, can alone be the object of Catholic worship.

In insisting on this definition of God we are not, of course, defending the ontological argument. With St. Thomas we maintain that the God with whom we are concerned is the

\* *A Monument to St. Augustine*, p. 167.

† *Summa Theologica*, I., ii., 1 ad 2.



God whose existence the ontological argument claimed to prove, but with St. Thomas we refrain from claiming that the ontological argument proves His existence. What is clear is that, if God *does* exist, His existence does not depend on anything outside Himself. M. Gilson observes that "to prove that necessary affirmation is analytically implied in the idea of God is, as St. Thomas remarks, to prove that God is necessary, if He exists, but it does not prove that He exists."\* St. Thomas indeed affirms that God's existence is self-evident, because God is His own existence, and so in the sentence "God exists" the subject and the predicate are the same. But "a thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself and to us," and "because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition [God exists] is not self-evident to us."† In other words, St. Thomas's real objection to the ontological argument is that we should have to get out of our own skins to see it. This point is often missed, and it is sometimes assumed that St. Thomas did not think that God's existence is an ontological necessity.‡ Nothing could be further from the truth. As M. Gilson insists,§ the very foundation of the Christian Faith is the truth which God gave to Israel and which, passing into philosophy, changed Aristotelianism into Christian Scholasticism—*Ego sum qui sum. Sic dices filiis Israel, Qui est misit me ad vos.* The self-existence of God is an immediate consequence of His existence, for, if that indeed exists than which nothing greater can be thought, it must exist of its own self, since there is nothing greater on which its existence can depend. It is only a step from *Quo majus nihil* to *Ego sum qui sum*, from the notion of God as that than which no greater can be thought to the notion of God as Pure Being.

And here there are two points which it will be well to note in passing. The former of these is that St. Thomas has no use for the type of idealism which identifies Pure Being with not-being. Pure Being is not an abstraction, a kind of highest common factor obtained by eliminating from all beings the characteristics which are not common to all of them, so that

\* *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, E. Gilson, Paris, 1932, p. 66: "Prouver que l'affirmation nécessaire est analytiquement impliquée dans l'idée de Dieu, c'est, selon la remarque de St. Thomas, prouver que Dieu est nécessaire, s'il existe, mais ce n'est pas prouver qu'il existe."

† *Summa Theologica*, I., ii., 1, *resp.*

‡ Dr. Broad recognises the point. "St. Thomas Aquinas, I think, would have held that it is necessary that there is something [*sc.* God] that exists, but that only God or angels can see the necessity of this fact. Men can see only that the existence of God is a necessary consequence of certain facts which, so far as we can see, are contingent—e.g., the fact that there is motion and qualitative change."—*Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, I., p. 23.

§ *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, chapter iii., *passim*.



nothing remains but an undifferentiated emptiness like the "bottomless vessel without any sides" of the schoolboy's definition of nothing. Pure Being is, for St. Thomas, not something *contained in* all created beings, but something *containing* them all and an infinity besides. To say that God is Pure Being is to say that He is supreme perfection, *actus purus*, the plenitude of all Actuality, *Deus meus et omnia*. The Supreme Being is not merely the Being who is supreme, but that which supremely *is*; the *maxime ens*, not just the *maximum ens*. Being, even imperfect created being, is not just a dead "thereness"; it is something active, living, and vocal of the divine creativeness. Here, of course, St. Thomas is not only running counter to idealism of a certain type, but to much modern realism as well. Created beings are often conceived of as merely a "thereness" with certain qualities, and any theistic implications to which they lead are derived by investigation as to how the qualities may be imagined to have got there. They are treated rather as a detective treats footprints, and God is deduced simply as the person who left them there. But, to the Catholic, created things are not merely footprints, they are voices speaking the present creativity of God. Because they participate in His perfection they are themselves endowed with something of His activity. Man's part in the world is not that of a scientific detective reasoning about clues left by some past event; he is himself present at the scene of the crime and he sees the clues being left there; indeed he is leaving some of them there himself. Such an interpretation of the world is familiar to all who have read the writings of Professor Whitehead, with his ceaseless insistence on creativity as the ultimate category.\* It would seem possible on some such lines to meet Dr. Tennant's criticism of St. Thomas's identification of being with perfection, according to which created beings have not complete being at all. For Dr. Tennant, any created being, just because it is "there," *is*, and, in consequence, being can admit of no degrees. For St. Thomas, on the other hand, being is literally *being*, it is activity; and in so far as anything falls short of complete activity, its being is imperfect. Of God alone can it be said that He fully *is*.

The other of these incidental points is concerned with the ontological argument. It has been insisted above that, while the ontological argument is at least unreliable, it is the God of the ontological argument who is the God of Catholic devotion. It is well to note in passing that the ontological argument professes to prove the existence of God from the bare concept of God. There is a type of argument, often confused with this,

\* *Process and Reality*, A. N. Whitehead, Cambridge, 1929, p. 28 *et passim*.



which attempts to prove the existence of God from man's thought about Him, considered as a concrete fact of experience, or from the power of man's mind to apprehend truth. This may be a hazardous type of argument, but it is empirical, not ontological. On much the same grounds the moral argument may be defended against such strictures as those of Dr. Tennant. Dr. Tennant, who considers that the moral argument cannot be made a foundation of theology, but that "the true place of moral considerations is as the coping-stone of a cumulative teleological argument,"\* writes as follows:† "The moral value judgment, which simply predicates value and nothing else, cannot carry us a step beyond itself towards knowledge as to the existence of anything which, if actual, would possess value. But, self-evident as this negative statement would seem, attempts have repeatedly been made to extract existential truth from ethical principles. . . . If the *summum bonum* has its possibility of realization guaranteed by the concept itself, Kant in principle employs the ontological argument in ethics after demolishing it in theology." This criticism may be true of Kant, but it is certainly not true of such a thinker as Professor A. E. Taylor. Professor Taylor, who makes moral considerations, not merely the coping-stone, but one of the foundation-stones of his theology, is far from attempting to derive the existence of God from the bare concept of His value. In a memorable chapter‡ he insists that value divorced from concrete existence is not value at all, and, whatever cogency Dr. Tennant's strictures may have against the moral argument as stated by Kant, they do not apply to it as it is handled by Professor Taylor, or, perhaps we might add, as, in a less whole-hearted way, by Dr. Tennant himself. In short, then, such a charge is not to be made without the greatest caution. To attempt to demonstrate the existence of God from the concept of His being or from the concept of His moral value is indeed "ontological," but to attempt to deduce it from the concrete fact of man's thought about Him or from the concrete fact of morality is as empirical as any argument derived from the consideration of the physical universe.

Having thus stated the definition of God which we propose to use, we may pass on to consider what arguments can be brought forward for His existence. At first sight this task might seem to be impossible. We have insisted that the God whom we need is the God of the ontological argument, but, in common with the great bulk of Christian thought from Aquinas onwards, we have agreed that the ontological argument, how-

\* *Philosophical Theology*, F. R. Tennant, Cambridge, 1928, 1930, II., p. ix.

† *Ibid.*, II., pp. 95, 97.

‡ *The Faith of a Moralist*, A. E. Taylor, London, 1930, I., chapter ii.



ever suggestive, is not to be relied on. It is here that St. Thomas himself comes to our rescue with the distinction between arguments that are *a priori*, or through the cause, and those that are *a posteriori*, or through the effect. He maintains that "we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence."\* That is to say, we can know *that God is* without knowing in its completeness *what He is*. We can see from an examination of the created universe that there is a Being corresponding to our definition, even if we cannot see all that that definition implies.

St. Thomas's demonstration of the existence of God is comprised in his famous five proofs, which are briefly outlined in the *Summa Theologica* and defended against criticism in the *Summa contra Gentes*. Professor Taylor has observed† that they are "all of them variations on the argument from 'motion,'" and it is worthy of note that among them the moral argument does not find a place except in so far as, in the fourth proof, goodness comes in as an element in perfection. They are all of them empirical in type—that is, they take as their starting-point the contingency, mutability, and incompleteness of the universe and the beings that compose it—and they are found in substance in Aristotle, though, as M. Gilson points out,‡ in being Christianised they entirely change their significance, since Aristotle, in common with Greek philosophy generally, conceived of God in terms of thought,§ while Christianity, inheriting from Judaism the great truth *Ego sum qui sum*, conceives of Him in terms of being.|| He is, for the Christian, not one who imposes form on pre-existent matter, but one who in literal fact creates out of nothing. The pagan may indeed say *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, but the Christian believes in the Creative Word *per quem omnia facta sunt*. To quote M. Gilson again, "There is only one God, and this God is being; this is the cornerstone of all Christian philosophy, and it is not Plato, it is not even Aristotle, it is Moses who laid it."¶

\* *Summa Theologica*, I., ii., 2 ad 3.

† *Essays Catholic and Critical*, 3rd ed., London, 1929, p. 49.

‡ *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, chapter iii.

§ Cf. Tennant: "Aristotle . . . needs the theistic idea, especially in the form of the conception of an unmoved Mover. He does not first obtain it, however, by inference from the nature of the world to the nature of its ground, but by *hypostatizing thought*."—*Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 153 (italics not in original).

|| Cf. A. E. Taylor: "Our conception of 'One God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth,' has come to us from two immediate sources, Greek science and philosophy and Hebrew prophecy."—*Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 58 (italics in original).

¶ *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, p. 55: "Il n'y a qu'un Dieu, et ce Dieu est l'être, telle est la pierre d'angle de toute la philosophie chrétienne, et ce n'est pas Platon, ce n'est même pas Aristote, c'est Moïse qui l'a posée."



The five proofs are summarised by St. Thomas himself in the following words:\*

(i.) "It is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."

(ii.) "It is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God."

(iii.) "We cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God."

(iv.) "The maximum of any genus is the cause of all in that genus. . . . Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God."

(v.) "Some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God."

For St. Thomas, as M. Gilson remarks,† all five proofs are conclusive, but the first of them has bearings upon the others which entitle it to a position of honour. The position is rather different to-day. For, even taking "motion" as synonymous with change, the "modern" mind does not seem to pay much attention to it as a reason for believing in the existence of God. The cause of this is psychological rather than logical, and is almost certainly associated with the classical scheme of dynamics instituted by Newton. When Newton enunciated his famous First Law of Motion, to the effect that every body continues in a state of rest or of *uniform rectilinear motion*, except in so far as it is acted upon by a force, he was, of course, simply formulating a law of physics, or rather giving an indirect definition of "force" as a mathematical concept, and the acceptance of the law as a methodological physical principle has no metaphysical significance (metaphysics, beware physics). But the use of the word "force" suggests an analogy with theories of effective causation, and this, combined with the general tendency to identify philosophy with physics, which prevailed during the two hundred years after Newton and culminated in the ponderous but now obsolescent system of Herbert Spencer, has produced a situation in which at least one type of change, namely uniform rectilinear motion, has been assumed to require no explanation whatever. And, even where no such crudely fallacious analogy has been drawn, there has arisen a type of thought which is ready to take change as a more or less ultimate fact requiring little explanation, except perhaps of a dialectical type. Thus we have the Creative-Evolutionism of Bergson,

\* *Summa Theologica*, I., ii., 3, *resp.*

† *Le Thomisme*, E. Gilson, 3rd ed., Paris, 1927, p. 67.



the Philosophy of Organism of Professor Whitehead, and the Evolutionary Theism of certain other modern theologians and philosophers, with the dialectical dynamism of Hegel looming in the background over them all. Most modern philosophy claims the necessity of God, not so much in order to account for the fact of change, but in order to explain why it is that anything exists at all. Thus the God of Professor Whitehead is the principle of decision and concretion, whose function is to determine what is to occur out of all the alternatives that are logically possible and to bring about its occurrence in concrete fact. This approach to God approximates rather to a combination of St. Thomas's second and third proofs than to anything else in his system. A quite different approach is, however, found in Dr. Tennant's thought, where there occurs an extremely striking modernisation of the argument from design, not applied, however, to individual objects, but to the universe as a whole. His Cosmic Teleology shows affinities, not with any of the first three proofs of St. Thomas, but rather with the fifth.

The fourth proof presents peculiar difficulties, for it is open to the charge of either proving the existence of something less than the Christian God or else lapsing into ontologism. M. Gilson, who makes heroic efforts to defend it, states the case against it with great fairness.\* It professes to prove the existence of a *maxime ens*. But is this maximum relative or absolute? That is, is it merely something superior to all created beings, or is it that than which no greater can be conceived? In the first case, it is urged, we have not the Christian God, and in the second case the argument cannot be sustained unless we leap over the wall into the garden of ontologism. M. Gilson replies in effect that, whatever may be true as regards other *genera*, in the *genus* of being, which is fundamental as other *genera* are not, the maximum cannot be relative but must be absolute. "It is possible," he says, "to conceive a relative supreme degree in any order of perfection except that of being."† We must refer to his own exposition for the development of this line of thought.‡ It is only necessary here to remark that the fourth proof does seem to be open to a type of objection from which the others are free.

It is impossible to discuss here in detail the applicability and validity of the Thomistic arguments, nor is it the purpose of this article to do so. Nevertheless it has seemed worth while to state them and to offer a few comments on them before passing on to consider some of the arguments that are commonly

\* *Le Thomisme*, p. 86.

† "Il est possible de concevoir un suprême degré relatif dans n'importe quel ordre de perfection, excepté dans celui de l'être."—*Le Thomisme*, p. 87.

‡ *Le Thomisme*, pp. 83 sqq.



advanced at the present day. It is always a good rule, in discussing a philosophical problem, to enquire first of all what St. Thomas says about it, and this is particularly true when one is dealing with the most vital problem of all.

Coming down, then, to the present day, we shall take as examples of three widely different approaches, all of which are definitely of the twentieth century, those that are found in the writings of Professor Whitehead, Dr. Tennant, and Professor A. E. Taylor. In each case we shall outline the argument, offer some comments upon it, and finally attempt to give an answer to the question as to whether it does in fact lead to the God of Catholic devotion, *quo majus nihil cogitari potest*.

## II

### THE PHILOSOPHY OF ORGANISM OF PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD

Professor Whitehead's approach, as might be expected from an eminent mathematician whose researches have been conducted largely in that borderland of mathematics and physics in which dwells the Theory of Relativity, is frankly cosmological. His great work *Process and Reality* bears as its sub-title *An Essay in Cosmology*. Indeed, it would probably be true to say that no philosopher has analysed as minutely as he has the nature and interrelations of the occurrences that make up the world which we experience. As is well known, his phraseology is highly technical, and it is extraordinarily difficult for anyone who has not steeped himself in the Whitehead dialectic to be certain that he has understood Professor Whitehead's meaning. In particular, the present writer would look upon it as an impertinence on his part if he were to attempt to adjudicate, for example, upon Professor Whitehead's theory of perception. Fortunately, however, the theological implications of the Philosophy of Organism are capable of appreciation apart from the technicalities of its phenomenology and epistemology. Professor Whitehead needs God, just as the old-fashioned forms of the cosmological argument did, to answer the questions "Why does anything exist?" and "Why does *this* exist rather than *that*?" questions which are indeed not independent, for concrete existence must be existence of particulars, and we cannot have anything which is not something. There is thus needed a first cause, a *causa omnium*, or (if we use "motion" as synonymous with change), in Aristotelian language, an "unmoved mover," though Professor Whitehead would not himself probably choose those terms. He prefers to describe God as the "principle of



concretion," as "that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts."\* His analysis of "objects" is, of course, vastly different from that of earlier philosophers. His "actual entities," described in terms of the "ingression" of "eternal objects" into them, seem superficially to bear little resemblance, for example, to the scholastic "substances" composed of "form" and "matter,"† but the problem with which he is dealing is essentially that which St. Thomas's second proof claimed to solve. It is the question "What is the ultimate reason for the existence of this one among many possible universes? Why *this* rather than *that*? Why anything rather than nothing?" St. Thomas answers that there must be a first efficient cause; Professor Whitehead answers that there must be a principle of concretion.

So far a Catholic Christian can walk with Professor Whitehead and rejoice, but when we enquire as to the nature of the principle of concretion we receive replies that are far from satisfactory. God has, we are told, two natures. His "primordial nature" is "the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects";‡ His "consequent nature" "results from his physical prehensions of the derivative actual entities."§ "Viewed as primordial, he is the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality"; as primordial He is not "eminently real" but "deficiently actual."|| There is, however, "a reaction of the world on God,"¶ and "his derivative nature is consequent upon the creative advance of the world."\*\* "One side of God's nature is constituted by his conceptual experience. This experience is the primordial fact in the world, limited by no actuality which it presupposes. . . . The other side originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side."†† We are here face to face with something very like an evolutionary deity, though Professor Whitehead does not appear to favour the term; God comes to consciousness through the

\* *Process and Reality*, p. 345.

† It is worth while noting that Professor Whitehead is a "realist" in the sense that for him the "bricks" of which the universe is made are the "actual entities," not the "eternal objects." One of the "categories of explanation" is the "ontological principle" according to which "actual entities are the only reasons" (*Process and Reality*, p. 33, italics in original). An eternal object is a "pure potential" (*Ibid.*, p. 31). Note also that from him "relativity" does not mean "non-absoluteness" so much as "universal relatedness." The meaning that the word bears in his "principle of relativity" (*Ibid.*, p. 30) has a different nuance from that which prompted the application of the name "Theory of Relativity" to the most famous of modern scientific theories.

‡ *Process and Reality*, p. 42.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 488.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

\*\* *Ibid.*, p. 486.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 486.

†† *Ibid.*, p. 489.



world, on which His (or, as Professor Whitehead writes, *his*) nature depends,\* and what He is depends upon what the world is. The fallacy underlying this view is not difficult to detect, subtle though it is; it consists in concluding that, because we have arrived at God as the principle in virtue of which the world exists, He is limited by the fact of its existence. It says in effect that, because we can see that the world must have been created by God, we can see that God must have created the world. The fact is, however, that these two "musts" are exactly opposite in their bearing; the former expresses that the world is dependent entirely on God, the latter that God is dependent entirely on the world, and so far are they from implying one another as to be mutually contradictory.† As St. Thomas urges time and time again, the relation between God and the world is entirely unilateral; the existence of the world in no way detracts from the nature of God, for all that is in the world is in a more eminent way in Him.

And here we come to the root defect in Professor Whitehead's theology. He would agree presumably that the primordial nature of God contains conceptually all (and infinitely more than all) that can be found in creation, for, as we have seen above, His primordial nature is "the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects," but he would add that this conceptual existence is less real than concrete existence in the created world, and hence that the presence of the created world to God (its "reaction" on Him) adds to Him something that He did not possess before. St. Thomas would here disagree *toto cælo*. God by Himself, he would reply, is not less, but infinitely more, real than this created world; He is the *maxime ens*; while the *entia* of created things are only participated and partial. The farthing candles that they hold to the Sun, so far from adding to Its light, are only sparks from It; the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world receives no augmentation from the lights that It has lit. There is no comparability between creation and other relations. We arrive at the notion of God from the creature's own insufficiency, which we argue requires that there be

\* "The consequent nature of God is conscious."—*Ibid.*, p. 488.

† It may be objected that since the propositions "The world was created by God" and "God created the world" are logically equivalent, therefore the propositions "It is necessary that the world was created by God" (or "The world must have been created by God") and "It is necessary that God created the world" (or "God must have created the world") are also logically equivalent. Necessity is, however, always relative to certain given conditions, and the conditions are not the same in the two cases. When these conditions are stated, the two propositions just mentioned become "Given the world, it is necessary that the world was created by God," and "Given God, it is necessary that God created the world," and these are not in any way convertible. This is why in the text it is stated that the two "musts" are exactly opposite in their bearing.



One who is self-sufficient; and if it is still urged that this "self-sufficient" God must lose some of His self-sufficiency through having created the universe, we can add to what has been said above that, according to Christian teaching, God is Love, and that the very nature of love (even of participated human love) is that it *cannot but do* that which it *need not do*.<sup>\*</sup> However contradictory this may sound, there is such a thing as love, as we know from our own experience, and, if love exists in the created world in spite of its apparent self-contradiction, we cannot urge apparent self-contradiction as an argument against the existence of God who is Love Itself. Professor Whitehead himself asserts that the existence of God is "the ultimate irrationality,"<sup>†</sup> and we may whole-heartedly agree, with the proviso that by "irrational" we here mean "elusive of our limited reason." It is just because our own reason is limited, participated, and partial that the complete Rationality of the divine Reason escapes from our grasp. The Christian, when all is done, admits that *omnia exeunt in mysterium*, but he adds *Credo ut intelligam*.

To proceed, Professor Whitehead's doctrine that God is limited by the world through its bearing on His conceptual nature involves a series of antitheses in which God and the World play interchangeable rôles. "It is as true," he writes, "to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and God fluent. It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many. . . . It is as true to say that God creates the World as that the World creates God,"<sup>‡</sup> for "God and the World are the contrasted opposites in terms of which Creativity achieves its supreme task of transforming disjoined multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition, into concrescent unity with its diversities in contrast."<sup>§</sup> There is something here that comes dangerously near to Pantheism, and it is difficult not to feel with Professor Taylor that "Dr. Whitehead's work would be even better than it is if it were influenced a little more by St. Thomas and a little less by Spinoza."|| But, just as every heresy has arisen through the giving of a wrong answer to a

\* Cf. Gilson: "Le bien est l'objet propre de la volonté; c'est donc la bonté de Dieu, en tant qu'elle est voulue et aimée par lui, qui est cause de la créature. Mais elle ne l'est que par l'intermédiaire de la volonté. Ainsi, nous posons à la fois qu'il y a en Dieu une tendance infiniment puissante à se diffuser hors de soi ou à se communiquer et que cependant il ne se communique ou diffuse que par un acte de volonté. Et ces deux affirmations, bien loin de se contredire, se corroborent."—*Le Thomisme*, p. 130.

† *Science and the Modern World*, p. 257.

‡ Cf. E. S. Waterhouse, *The Philosophical Approach to Religion*, p. 109. Professor Waterhouse describes Professor Whitehead's system as a "quasi-theism."

§ *Process and Reality*, p. 492.

|| THEOLOGY, xxi., p. 79, August, 1930.



real problem, so here too Professor Whitehead is trying to meet a difficulty which quite definitely must be faced. It is the old question, "What was God doing before He created the world?" and the famous reply that He was making a hell for the inquisitive will hardly satisfy the philosophical mind. Professor Whitehead, seeing quite clearly that his "primordial nature of God" is a pure abstraction, replies that there never was a time when the world was not. To him God and the world are inseparable; God always has the world to confront Him and so always has something to do. But the Christian Church has a different answer. Of the world she is willing to admit that *ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*; the need that God has of self-expression for His very existence is met, not by any going forth outside Himself, but by the eternal internal procession of the generation of the Divine Word. Just because the Father, who is the Ground of every possibility, generates from all eternity, by the very necessity of His being, the consubstantial uncreated Word, there is in the essence of the Godhead that perfect activity, that *actus purus*, which distinguishes the Christian God from the shadowy abstraction which Professor Whitehead's God, apart from the world, would become. To appropriate for a moment his terminology, we might say that the primordial nature of God belongs immediately to the Father, and that the consequent nature, through the reaction of which upon Him the Father's true reality is achieved, belongs immediately to the eternally begotten Word and not, as Professor Whitehead teaches, to the world, which owes its own derivative existence to the creative action of the Word, who is not only the *Λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, but also the *δημιουργικὴ Σοφία*. It is not that the world "reacts" on God, bringing about the completion of His nature,\* but that the Word "reacts" on the Father; and this mutual reaction is what Catholic theology describes as the eternal spiration of the Holy Ghost. Where Professor Whitehead sees "Creativity achiev[ing] its supreme task of transforming disjoined multiplicity . . . into concrescent unity," the Catholic sees the Holy Spirit uniting the Father and the Word in the eternal bond of love.

The pantheising tendency which has been referred to above is a common feature of systems that combine belief in a unipersonal Deity with a thoroughgoing attempt to account for the existence of the phenomenal world. This has been very thoroughly expounded by Professor S. N. Bulgakov, who remarks on its occurrence in certain phases of the Arian controversy. "A unipersonal [*lit.*, monhypostatic] God," he writes, "is in need of the World *for Himself*, and therefore

\* Cf. *Process and Reality*, p. 488, ll. 15, 16.



the World enters as a necessary element into the divine life. God is not the same after creation as before creation, and, from the other side, the World becomes God in so far as it enters into the inner life of the Deity. In this way there appear in unipersonal theism the ill-boding tints of pantheism, of theocosmism."\* Tripersonal theism, however, is free from this taint. "God possesses Himself absolutely, as an Individual in virtue of His tripersonality, as substance in virtue of His divine essence, and as the consubstantial Trinity in the indivisibility of His individuality and essence."† It is the doctrine of the Holy Trinity that renders it possible to believe in a God who is transcendent without being inactive, and who is immanent without being servile.

Professor Whitehead's leaning towards a synthesis of Christianity and Buddhism, which is so clearly evidenced in *Religion in the Making*, is hardly surprising coming from one who views God and the World as essentially interdependent, but he makes an heroic attempt to defend the personality of God by dwelling on what he calls "the tender elements in the world."‡ It is impossible not to be moved by the deep piety of a profoundly religious soul which shews itself in this, but it is also difficult to feel that anything like the God of Christian theism, who is not merely, in some degree or mode, *loving* but *is Love*, is really at home in Professor Whitehead's system. In the first place, one of the weakest parts of the whole Philosophy of Organism is that in which personality appears. From the very start terms are used that in ordinary speech would suggest consciousness, but it is made clear that their use is purely analogical and that no implication of consciousness is intended. There are *prehensions*, but these are simply "concrete facts of relatedness";§ there are *subjective forms*, but these are simply "private matters of fact";|| there are *feelings*, but these are just "positive prehensions."¶ In *Process and Reality* an analysis of consciousness is not given until chapter iv. of Part III., and there it is difficult not to feel a subtle transition from the purely relational character of the earlier use of such terms as the above to the meanings that they bear in ordinary speech. It seems evident that so indefinable and (as most people would agree) unanalysable a notion as that of consciousness must either come in at the beginning or not at all, and, in consequence, one may hazard the suggestion that, in the last resort, consciousness, and personality which is involved in it, do not find a very comfortable place in Professor Whitehead's system.

\* *The Burning Bush*, p. 264.

† *Process and Reality*, p. 485.

|| *Ibid.*

† *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 32.



In the second place, even if his arguments are sound, they hardly give us what we need. Christian belief in the personality of God requires something more for its satisfaction than "the great companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands." As has just been remarked, the Christian God is not just *loving*, He is *Love*; *quo majus nihil* implies perfect, active, and triumphant love. We may sympathize with Professor Whitehead's God, we may be overwhelmingly grateful to Him, we may even be sorry for Him, but when all is said and done, however much we may depend on Him, however much we may feel drawn to Him, we cannot render Him the supreme homage of adoration. A God who, not by an act of free and unfettered condescension, but by the very necessity of His being, is limited by and dependent on the world, is a pathetic figure. He may be a big brother, He may be a loving friend, He may be worthy of great veneration, but He cannot claim the ultimate tribute of *latreia*. With Evodius we shall say, "I would not call that God." We could think of something greater.

However much, therefore, we may marvel at Professor Whitehead's amazing analytical genius, and however much we may be impressed by the positive results which he achieves, we must as Christians insist that something further is required if the Philosophy of Organism is to be made a satisfactory basis for Christian theism, and that that something is the revelation which God has given of Himself as the self-existent absolute Being in whom all perfections are united and realised, and who is tripersonal and consubstantial.

E. L. MASCALL.

(To be concluded)



## MISCELLANEA

### CORRESPONDENCE

#### VERSIONS OF THE BIBLE

DEAR SIR,

In your editorial in the November THEOLOGY, advocating a new format for the Bible, your short reference to R. G. Moulton's *The Modern Reader's Bible* gives the impression that it is retranslated, and attainable only in six volumes, of which some are now out of print.

This is misleading. Except for slight changes of wording involved in the adaptation to modern literary structure, the text is that of the Revised Version, with (in many cases) the marginal readings preferred to those of the text, and the whole is published by Macmillan in one volume.

Several of the changes you desiderate are embodied in it—such as, beginning a new book with Isaiah xl.; arranging the Epistles of St. Paul in their probable chronological order (the earlier ones as insertions in Acts); printing Job as a drama, with the names of the speakers indicated; the Apocalypse is placed at the very end, with St. John's Gospel just before it.

Every book is printed in its modern literary format—*e.g.*, editorial additions are treated as footnotes in small type; suitable headings and titles are inserted freely; poetry is printed in the forms that bring out the various structures employed; every modern device of varying type is used; and the chapters—with enough verses to shew the reader where he is—are indicated in the margin.

Not only is the whole Bible included—which has great advantages—but also among the Wisdom Books (printed in the order of their philosophical sequence) Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon are included. Tobit finds a place, just before Esther, in Stories of the Exile.

It is always a surprise to me that this excellent version of the Bible appears to be so little known; hence my venturing to call further attention to it.

CLAUD H. EDMUNDS.

ST. AUGUSTINE'S VICARAGE,  
LEICESTER.

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#### CHURCH AND STATE

SIR,

There may be other readers of THEOLOGY besides myself who, whilst appreciating the argument of the second section of Mr. Demant's article on the Problem of Church and State, feel that in any discussion of that problem as relating to the Anglican establishment, more attention must be given to historical factors and circumstances which have moulded the alliance than is accorded in his first section. The distinguished succession of writers from Hooker to Burke may not be lightly disregarded; nor may their perception that other factors besides abstract logic are influential in fashioning the religious and civil administration of a nation be dismissed by the assertion that such a standpoint is "concerned with



the welfare not of the Church, but of the State." This verdict is certainly untrue of both Hooker and Warburton, to whom Mr. Demant applies it.

I venture to hope, therefore, that a more adequate treatment of history will be afforded than that which, for example, writes that "the King is head of the Church and the royal supremacy operates in spiritual matters through Parliament." Who would suspect that this simple statement conceals more than a century of constitutional conflict and development from 1536 to 1662? Or again, the affirmation that "the Church assembly known as Convocation was assembled at the King's direction, but was not permitted to confer or deliberate on any of the affairs of the Church"; to which is added the further item of information that "a protest against a latitudinarian revision of the Prayer Book in 1689 had already led to the suppression of the Church's own assembly, Convocation." Would Mr. Demant explain the cause of the suppression of Convocation from 1664 to 1689, which surely stands in need of some mention?

I have suggested already that the charge of indifference to the Church is untrue of Hooker and Warburton; and Mr. Demant's reference to Warburton is the more remarkable in that he stresses the influence of Figgis "in emphasizing the independent life of associations within the State of which the Church was one." Yet Figgis himself paid tribute to the emphasis laid by Warburton upon precisely this point; observing that Warburton argued of Church and State that "the two are bodies incorporate with different ends and each has a real will and a real personality of its own, distinct from that of any one or the sum of its members." Further, Figgis continued: "This opinion is interesting in view of recent developments of Genossenschaftrecht. It is strange indeed that Dr. Gierke and Professor Maitland should have their counterpart in a latitudinarian ecclesiastic, writing at a time when political and theological thought was essentially atomistic; yet it can hardly be denied that Warburton was what they would have called a 'realist,' even if the realism be imperfect." It is strange that Mr. Demant omitted to notice this feature of Warburton's *Alliance*.

Much indeed may be learned from a theoretic approach to the problem of Church and State; much also from an historical. But readers may surely ask that a writer who turns his attention to both aspects should furnish a less jejune treatment of the history of Church and State in England than Mr. Demant's first section presents.

Yours faithfully,

N. SYKES.

### THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF MIRACLE

VIEWS now reckoned as commonplaces may still be open to criticism, and the wider their currency the more need there is for the criticisms to be considered. Professor Taylor provides examples when he speaks of "the prevalent fashion of talking freely about 'emergent' evolution" as if the phrase was the '*explanation*' of a process, not merely a '*useful description*'" (*Faith of a Moralist*, 167); and of the equally prevalent habit of ruling out the existence of mental "faculties" in the name of modern psychology "though no psychologist can escape the employment of some



synonymous term." We may add the condemnation of any argument on the sole ground that it is an a priori argument—a condemnation in which an a priori argument seems to be involved.

The view I discuss in this article is expressed in a dictum by Dr. Williams in a recent number of *THEOLOGY* (October, 1934, 232), in which he accepts, and then gives a proof of, a statement by Dr. Tennant. The dictum runs thus: "Alleged miracle is devoid of all evidential value" (so Tennant). "This is merely a commonplace of modern apologetic method; we cannot employ the Virginal Conception as *evidence* for the Godhead of Jesus, for the simple reason that belief in the Virginal Conception *presupposes* belief in the Godhead of Jesus."

1. *A Preliminary Criticism.*—The dictum needs some restatement. (a) The argument does not *prove* the "commonplace"; to prove that miracle cannot be evidence for the *incarnation* is not to prove that it is evidence for nothing at all. (b) In considering the evidential value of miracle, the *primary* miracle, the physical resurrection, must not be omitted—it, rather than the virgin birth, is the test case. I prefer then the term "miracle," which will stand for either. And for brevity's sake I prefer "incarnation" to the "godhead of Jesus."

The dictum restated will run thus: (i.) The commonplace, miracle is not *evidence* for the incarnation (or for the divine), is true; (ii.) "for the simple reason" that belief in miracle *presupposes*—i.e., involves *prior*—belief in the incarnation (or the divine).

I do not wish to make out a case, still less a complete case, for either side, but to suggest certain lines of thought on special *aspects* of the case which may lead to something like demonstrable conclusions—an over-ambitious aim perhaps, in spite of its being a limited one, and yet worth enterprising.\*

2. By way of introduction I summarize some of the points in one of the most considerable recent discussions on the subject—i.e., in Professor Taylor's *Faith of a Moralist*. The order of the points is mine.

(a) "'Miracle' in the strict sense of the word must combine the two characteristics of being a superhuman 'wonder' and being a 'sign'" — a sign, namely, of the "direct operation" of God (178). It follows that the "wonder" belongs to the "sensible order." Hence the physical resurrection is a miracle. The incarnation in itself is not; Christ's godhead, his sinlessness, his continual risen life, and his present relations with us, though supernatural, are not facts or events that make their appeal to us through our senses. (So, I presume, Taylor's view implies.)

(b) *Between the Supernatural and the Miraculous there is a Sharp Distinction.*—"There can be no religion without belief in the supernatural, but there may well be religion without belief in the miraculous" (xiv., cf. 156).

(c) *The Necessity of Supernatural Events.*—Christian belief has an historical basis. The story "of the passion and exaltation" of Christ is a story "of what *has been done* by a real man who was also something more than a real man." . . . "A mythical Christ would no longer be evidence to the character of God." Christ's "triumph over death" is evidence for the fact that "love and goodness have 'power as they have manifest authority'" (117).

(d) *The non-Necessity, but Reality and Value, of Miraculous Events.*—"One may intelligibly hold that the belief in a real continual activity

\* But see note at end of article.



. . . of Christ, and in the reality of the contacts between [him] and his disciples . . . is what is essential, and everything else [including, I suppose, the physical resurrection] matter of criticism and speculation" (140). This minimum, I think, of what we can "intelligibly hold" is not, perhaps, meant to be considered as all that it is reasonable and valuable for us to hold. There would be no point in writing at length about miracle as a sign and evidence of the divine if the actual occurrence of miracle were a matter of merely speculative interest. When Professor Taylor spoke of the "triumph of Christ over death," I presume that (like Dr. Selwyn—see 3, below) he had in mind the physical resurrection, apart from which the triumph would not have been obvious.

(e) *Additional Premises, or Assumptions*.—The acceptance of an historical fact as a *supernatural* fact—e.g., of Christ as "the Word 'made flesh,'" involves not merely "empirical evidences" but "an act of 'faith'" (126, cf. xii). Similarly of miracles. When a wonder is accepted as a sign, "as disclosing the divine purpose, one is, I should say, in the presence of an act of 'faith.' This particular act of faith would cease to be possible if the believer were convinced that the alleged act had never occurred; but the completest *probatio facti* would not compel the further act of faith in its significance. . . ." (181, 2).

(f) *Comments*.—I set down five points, to some of which reference will be made in the course of the discussion. The first three are, I think, involved in the preceding summary. The rest are mine. (i.) A "wonder" is a necessary element in a miracle. (ii.) A miracle is evidence—a sign—of a divine fact. (iii.) Belief in a miracle—i.e., a sign of a divine fact—*does not presuppose*, but is part of the reason for our belief in, the divine fact (which it signifies). There is a genuine advance from the datum to the conclusion. The additional premises, or "acts of faith," involved do not make the argument circular.

Also: (iv.)—Belief in a miracle involves belief in its *congruity* with the divine and with the situation in which it occurs. (This is why we do not accept the miracles of the apocryphal gospels, and why, even if the resurrection of one of the Cæsars were as certain as his death, we should not regard him as really *divus* Cæsar—as a god, and still less as God.)

(v.) I cannot find that Taylor says very much in explanation of the "act of faith" on which he lays stress. So far as it goes beyond the recognition of the congruity spoken of in (iv.) I do not feel that I see its meaning clearly enough to be sure of its necessity.

3. The "commonplace" is less of a commonplace than one is led to suppose. The view that miracle is evidence for *something*—and perhaps even for the incarnation—seems to be held (not perhaps always consistently) by many, possibly most, of those writers who are fully in favour of modern apologetic methods, including several representatives of what Knox and Vidler (following Dr. Thouless) call the school of "empirical catholicism."

Thus Dr. Mozley (in *Essays Catholic and Critical*), though he says a good deal on behalf of the *non-evidential* view, makes in a footnote a special "reservation" as regards the resurrection: "The truth of Christianity and the truth of the resurrection are inseparable, and part of the *evidence* [my italics] for the resurrection is the account of the tomb that was found empty" (200, n.). Christianity, we may add, is also inseparable from the incarnation, so that the evidence for the resurrection is evidence for both.

We find a similar line of thought in the essay by Dr. Selwyn: "The full



truth of the resurrection requires each strand of the threefold cord of *evidence* for its apprehension," one of them being the "empty tomb," which is "the great pledge that death has indeed been conquered" (*ib.*, 319; my italics).

To the same effect we have Fr. Thornton's definition of miracles as "unusual events in which we catch a glimpse of a divine purpose . . ." (*ib.*, 146). "Superhuman 'wonder,'" which is Professor Taylor's expression, seems preferable to "unusual." But, at any rate, a "glimpse" of a purpose seems to be *evidence* of a purpose.

4. The "corollary" or "congruity" argument. (a) I begin with a preliminary point about *probability*. In speaking of religious evidences I assume that (like evidences in natural science) they lead to conclusions which are more or less probable. If our belief were a belief incapable of increase, all evidences, including non-miraculous evidences based on modern apologetic methods, would be superfluous. To allow that they are not superfluous is to allow that belief is capable of increase, and that our conclusions, from an intellectual standpoint, are probable, even if from other standpoints we regard them as practically certain. I do not think that this view of evidences is irrational or irreverent—it has the imprimatur of writers of unquestioned orthodoxy from Bishop Butler to Bishop Gore.

To avoid misunderstanding I put what I have just said in more detail. Let us grant that as Christians we have or ought to have a faith which involves knowledge or complete certainty. Yet most Christians (consistently or not) see nothing unfitting in the use of "evidences." Now evidences are never supposed to be of such a sort that they can *compel* faith—they lead to forms of intellectual belief which vary in degree. For the sake of the argument—to avoid circumlocution—I say that they vary in probability.

(b) The view that miracle is a corollary (*i.e.*, a necessary result) of, or congruous with (*i.e.*, a probable result of), the incarnation is customarily put forward as an *alternative* to the evidential view. In reality, however, I think the first view supports the second. No doubt it would be a recognized fallacy to argue: If A is true, B is true; B is true, therefore A is true. But there is no fallacy in arguing: If the incarnation is true, miracles are true (or probable); miracles are true (or probable); therefore the probability of the incarnation is increased. Arguments of this type are involved whenever, in discussing circumstantial evidence or in making scientific experiments, we put forward a hypothesis, deduce its consequences, and compare them with the facts. If the consequences are unconfirmed, the hypothesis breaks down; if they are confirmed, the probability of the hypothesis being true is to some extent increased—a point discussed at length in modern books dealing with the grounds of probability and induction.

If we take "corollary" in the strict sense of a necessary result, it *must*, I think, be false to say that miracle is an unnecessary part of our credenda "for the simple reason" that if an alleged event does not have its "necessary" result, the event did not happen.

The *congruity* argument, too, involves a negative conclusion, and it is one which appeals to some people with considerable force. On the assumption that the incarnation will have miracle for its *probable* result, the absence of miracle, or the unreliability of the historical evidence for them, seems to decrease the probability of the incarnation itself.

We must, however, notice that Professor Taylor envisages the *possi-*



bility of this kind of non-miraculous Christianity, while Professor Webb, I think, *prefers* it: "... Even if satisfied of their [miracles'] occurrence, we should still be doubtful of their value as evidences of religion; and on this account there are many to whom belief in any other kind of miracle than that involved in the sacramental mediation of spiritual grace through material means has ceased to be a part of their religious faith" (THEOLOGY, May, 1926, 274).

Whichever view we take, the fact that the congruity argument *presupposes* belief in the probability of the incarnation, and then argues from miracle to the *increased* probability of the incarnation, does not make the argument invalid.

5. The "*presupposition*" objection.—Miracle is non-evidential for the incarnation "for the simple reason" that belief in miracle *presupposes*—involves *prior*—belief in the incarnation.

The objection has, I think, been met in the previous sections. We have just seen that it does not apply to the congruity argument. We can also see that it does not apply to the argument in which we begin by assuming miracle to have the incarnation as its only possible cause (or "part-cause"). To make this assumption is not the same as assuming that either miracle or the incarnation are *actual facts*, and it is expressed in the conditional statement: If miracle is true, then the incarnation is true (or probable). It follows that if (on historical grounds) we accept miracle, we can infer the truth or probability of the incarnation.

The fact that we need some additional premise, or assumption, about *e.g.* congruity (explained above in section 1 (f) above) does not make the argument circular.

Nor is the argument made invalid by the fact that the degree of probability it gives is a low one. No doubt we get a higher degree from the customary evidences based, say, on Christ's character, claims, and consciousness, or on "religious experience"; but that does not prevent the argument from miracle having a corroborative value.

In what I say next I have no wish to make a display of technical "text-book" logic; but if, as I think, such technicalities are, or may be, involved in the objection, we cannot avoid reference to them in the reply. When an acute thinker says, "A is B *for the simple reason* that C is D," he is claiming to *see* something that makes his conclusion obvious. Consequently (quite contrary to his intentions) we are liable to be bluffed into accepting his conclusion just on his authority. It is not enough for us to say that we *don't* see—that may be due to our obtuseness. The reasoner who says "I see" puts us in the wrong unless we can shew cause that what he "sees" is not there, or that what he sees is not what he thinks it to be, and that his mistake can be explained. The attempt to shew all this is really an important point in the argument. So I incorporate it in the text of this article instead of relegating it to the learned obscurity of a footnote.

I suggest that the objection, owing to a confusion of thought, may be taken in a sense which is plausible, yet clearly invalid as soon as it is considered.

Believing that a *cause*, the recent heavy rain, involves and is prior to the *effect*, the flooded river, we assume that belief in the recent flood involves a *prior* belief in the recent rain. But plainly it doesn't. I may have had no information about, and never have thought of, the rain before I knew about the flood.



There is another possibility. I may argue: If there was flood, there was rain; there was flood, therefore there was rain. So far, there is no suggestion of a prior belief in the rain. But the sentence I began with has the corollary: If there was no rain, there was no flood; and from the corollary I may jump to the false conclusion, Belief in the flood involves a prior belief in the rain.

Putting the thing in another way, we have four assertions: (a) F (the flood) involves R (rain). (b) From F, R can be inferred. (c) Belief in F involves belief in R. (d) (False) Belief in F involves *prior* belief in R. I suggest that (d) is taken to be true because it is confused with one or other of the preceding statements.

6. *An Analogy.*—The restatements by modern philosophers, such as Professor Taylor and Professor Webb, of the traditional arguments for the nature and character of God are, I think, in some ways analogous to the arguments which we may rightly base on the miraculous. In all these arguments we start with some sort of consciousness of the divine, if we are to reach a fuller and deeper consciousness. (Even in natural science we do not start with mere observed facts; if we did, we could never get beyond them. We start with the observed facts and with the belief or assumption that there is an order of nature with which they harmonize.) Thus Professor Webb speaks of "the natural sense of the presence of God" apart from which "the arguments for [His existence] would have no religious significance." But he says also: "It is only in the context of such reasoning as is formulated in [such arguments] that the sense of presence can be properly called religious or its object God" (*Religion and Theism*, 114). Similarly, when in historical facts we see the divine, we see it not solely in the light of historical evidences, but in the light of what Taylor calls an "act of faith" (for spiritual things are spiritually discerned).

The fact, however, that by means of these additional premises or presuppositions we are enabled to see the supernatural in the natural does not mean that the "routes" from "Nature to God" or from "Man to God" (Taylor's phrases) are routes in which there is no real progress, that the progress is not made, at least in part, by reasoning, or that the reasoning is circular and therefore unreal.

Similarly, when we argue from the miraculous to the divine, we do not start, as we have seen, with bare wonders; we recognize them as signs of, and as congruous with, the divine. The recognition may involve "acts of faith," or presuppositions, just as they are involved in the restated traditional arguments, or, for the matter of that, in the inductive sciences. But it does not follow that the beliefs for which we think we have evidence are only the same as the beliefs on which our evidence is based—that the premises of our argument presuppose the conclusion we profess to prove.

I am conscious of not having demonstrated nearly as much as I should like to think I had. But I have certainly succeeded in developing my own doubts about alleged demonstrations which seem sometimes to be taken at their face value because they are unquestioned, not because they are unquestionable. Something may have been gained if I have shewn that the doubts are neither obscurantist nor altogether unreasonable.

ALFRED D. KELLY.



## NOTE

THE following Note was written by the late Father Brown, of the Oxford Mission to Calcutta. Many will be glad to have it in print, both for its own sake and as a memorial of a devoted priest whose life was given to India.

## ST. MATTHEW xxiii. 8-10

Have we not failed to do justice to this important passage, partly owing to the long dominance of a false reading—corrected in R.V.—and partly owing to inadequate translation? In verse 8 the word "Christ" has now been banished from the text and is not even mentioned in critical editions. Who, then, is the one teacher (διδάσκαλος) indicated by the words? The true text does not help us to answer this question, and it might be supposed that our Lord does really mean Himself, in spite of the suppression of His Name. But in v. 10 a different rôle is assigned to Him, and to supply even mentally the word "Christ" in v. 8 creates a badly balanced statement. Does not "St. Matthew"—whoever he may be—intend the hiatus to be supplied by the Third Person of the Holy Trinity, though in accordance with the curious reserve of the first two gospels about Him he refrains from mentioning Him by name? Certainly we have abundant reason elsewhere for naming the Holy Spirit as the permanent teacher of the Church after Christ's ascension, and St. Matthew himself assigns to Him that character (x. 20) in one of the rare places in his gospel where He is mentioned. We should thus have a very early reference to the Holy Trinity, and this passage would be a foreshadowing of the more explicit reference in xxviii. 19, and the two passages would mutually support each other's authority.

But now let us look at the very rare and remarkable word by which our Lord in this passage describes His own activity. The word *καθηγητής* is unknown to the N.T., unknown to the LXX, and almost unknown to classical authors until we come to the time of Plutarch. And yet its meaning is not at all doubtful. It means leader, discoverer, pioneer, pathfinder; and surely our translators might have found for it some more adequate translation than the hard-worked "master." St. Matthew is fond of introducing a distinctive word where an ordinary one lies close at hand,\* and he has evidently chosen his *καθηγητής* very carefully. Its exact implication is nowhere else ascribed to our Lord, though *ἀρχηγός* comes somewhere near it. Is it a word which we can afford to lose? Take Walt Whitman's song of the Pioneers and see what enthusiasm they aroused in the middle years of the nineteenth century. That is the kind of enthusiasm we want to arouse in the Church by recognizing that it was found first in our Lord. St. Paul speaks of some who were *εφευρεταὶ κακῶν*—inventors of new forms of vice; may we not think of our Lord as *εφευρετὴς ἀγαθῶν*, the inventor and discoverer of new forms of goodness into which, as the glorious Leader, He invites us to follow Him and take possession? True, the *thing* has always been there whether we have had the *word* or not. We think of the great conquests of the Religious Orders, or of the abolition of slavery, or the wonderful Scout movement of our own day which is changing the face of the world. But

\* Compare, for instance, Matt. vi. 28 with Luke xii. 27.



there is an inspiration which comes from words, from calling things by their right names, and to think of our Lord as the Pioneer of a new age, which He always is, is to hear His call to right the old wrongs, and to claim fresh regions for His kingdom, and to press forward the work of His mission to all the world.

E. F. BROWN.

### CHRISTIAN SALVATION: AN ANGLO-SCANDINAVIAN THEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE

In *THEOLOGY* for September, 1931 (pp. 160-165), there appeared an account of a Theological Conference held in the previous July at Sparreholm, Sweden, between Anglicans and Lutherans from the Churches of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. That Conference was the second of a series, of which the first had been held at Selwyn College, Cambridge, in June, 1929, at the invitation of the Master, the late Rev. G. E. Newsom. The third of the series was held in 1934, from July 26 to August 1, at the Palace, Gloucester, by the kindness of the Bishop of Gloucester, who acted as host to the party and was able to be present at some of the meetings.

The subject of the discussions three years ago was "Platonism and Christianity"; this year it was the kindred subject of "Christian Salvation." In both cases the members of the Conference had been asked to prepare memoranda not exceeding 1,000 words, and these were duplicated and distributed beforehand. One cannot give a better account of the Conference than by printing in full a résumé of the discussions which was presented to the Conference at the closing session. It is a personal résumé, and seeks rather to reproduce some of the interesting things said in the discussions than to summarize the papers. Each subject (except the last) was introduced by a Scandinavian and an Anglican speaker, and a round-table discussion followed.

The subjects were:

(1) The Need of the Modern World for Salvation: Dr. Michael Neiiendam, Chaplain to the King of Denmark, and Dr. A. C. Bouquet, Cambridge.

(2) Creation and the Fall: Dr. Brodersen, Copenhagen (who was unable to come, but sent a valuable paper) and Canon Quick, Durham.

(3) The Ethico-Philosophical Idea of Salvation: Dr. Ljunggren, Dean of Gothenburg, and Dr. C. C. J. Webb, Oxford.

(4) The Mystical Way of Salvation: Dr. Pleijel, Lund (acting as deputy for Professor Nygren, the author of *Agape and Eros*, who submitted the paper), and the Rev. J. S. Boys Smith, Cambridge.

(5) The Incarnation and the Atonement as God's Way of Salvation: Bishop Aulén of Strängnäs, Sweden, the author of *Christus Victor*, and Canon J. K. Mozley, of St. Paul's.

(6) Salvation as a Present Reality: Dr. Einar Molland, Oslo, and Fr. Hebert, S.S.M., Kelham.

(7) Salvation as Future: The Last Things: Dr. H. Ording, Oslo, and the Bishop of Southwark.

(8) The Church and the Message of Salvation in the Modern World: Archdeacon Hunter, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.



The résumé of the discussions is as follows:

(1) It was important to begin with a discussion about the modern world, because our discussions are not academic. The world is in need of the Salvation of which the secret has been given to us. Yet people in general do not seem to desire an other-worldly salvation. In spite of the calamities which have come on the world, people have an unabated belief in the future: they are always asking whither things are moving. But there is much that conspires to destroy religious habits: the petrol motor; interest in psychology, which seems to "explain" religion by setting out the motives which move men to be religious; the weakening of family life and the religious atmosphere of the home. The experience of different countries seems to be strangely alike.

(2) Broadly speaking, the first half of the Conference dealt with man, the subject of salvation, and the latter half with God's saving work. The relation between the two is of great importance, because Salvation is the salvation of *man*; man's original nature is the basis of God's saving work; man is made in God's image. Man's sin arises out of his greatness, when he sets up his own derived divinity in rivalry to God's essential Divinity. Thus it is that the myths of many nations contain the Prometheus- or Titan-motif: man seeking to make himself a god. It is a mistake, therefore, with Barth and also E. Hirsch, to identify creatureliness with sinfulness; acceptance of creatureliness becomes in the Cross of Christ the way of Salvation.

(3) That man is made in God's image is shewn in his sense of the moral law as a categorical imperative—i.e., the demand is absolute, whether I wish to obey it or not; it is not conditional upon my desiring some end, such as to be successful or happy. This remains true, in spite of the facts that conscience in us is always more or less imperfect and is often plainly in need of being educated, and that conscience is disobeyed.

(4) That man is made in God's image is also shewn in the endeavour of Mysticism to make a way for man to attain to God. Mysticism is indeed pagan in origin, and in certain respects is radically opposed to Christianity. It is an individual way to God, a way for an élite; it assumes that one part of human nature, one department of experience, is divine; hence, it has no essential need for the Incarnation. Christianity, on the contrary, teaches that God has been manifested *in the flesh* and not otherwise; not in one department of experience, but in the one whole man, Christ.

At the same time, the possibility of a true reconciliation of Christianity and Mysticism cannot be denied. And more widely, the positive importance of the humanistic tradition in Christendom is that it insists that, whatever be the meaning of Revelation and of Salvation, it is always apprehended *within* experience; and that religion cannot rightly be divorced from Culture. Culture in our day is going through a period of crisis; new experiments are being made in Germany and Russia. Christianity is false to itself whenever it seeks to isolate itself from Culture; it will have to help the world to create a new culture.

(5) The Incarnation and the Atonement constitute God's way of Salvation. The Christian dogma is often called "mythological"; it is said that Mysticism, as personal religion, is much the same in all the religions, but that each rears its own structure of dogma. God is regarded as the "totality of values," as the permanent background of religion. If, on the other hand, God is not merely the object of religion, but living



and active, then the "mythological" dogma can well be the description of His real action.

The principle of the Incarnation is that God is manifested in the flesh, in human nature, not in something more than human nature. Christ is not the highest product of evolution—i.e., ordinary man with something added, a higher development of humanity. The manhood of Christ is common ordinary humanity; it is the old Adam that is lifted up to God. This is the total denial of the possibility of a Super-man.

The Incarnation is the work of God's Agape; as such it makes possible for man a true victory over sin and death—not mere victory, but creative victory, the victory expressed in the self-giving of man to God and the sacrifice of the self.

(6) Thus Salvation becomes a present reality, while at the same time it is future and also eternal. Christians belong at once to this order and to the eternal order. It is a fundamental conception in the Gospels that in God's coming to man in the flesh, and in the actualization of God's Kingdom in man in the flesh, the eternal order is projected into the present; thereby man shares in a Salvation that is at once present and future, real, but as yet incomplete. So it is that in the liturgy man shares in the heavenly worship, and past, present, and future are seen *sub specie æternitatis*.

The Church is the proper sphere of Salvation. God has created a unity for men, a universal Family, the mystical Body of Christ. Baptism, eucharist, and the episcopal ministry all embody and express the actuality of the eternal in the present, Salvation as a present fact, the divine character of the Church. The Church is divine, and at the same time human and imperfect. The essential outward forms of the Church are catholic (universal), because they express and embody the divine redemption once for all accomplished in Christ.

(7) Salvation is also future. There are "last things." The conception of Christian eschatology excludes the idea of an infinite progress, an everlasting going on and on, because it affirms a consummation of victory, a real victory. Therefore it implies Eternity. Time exists relatively to impermanence and unfulfilment, and the present world of Time has positive value because Time is essential to growth, and Time is the condition of Sacrifice and therefore of the achievement of Salvation. But Eternity means that Salvation has been achieved.

The popular eschatology of the period now past, which took the symbolical descriptions in the N.T. as literal statements of fact, has now been succeeded by widespread confusion of mind on the part of the common man, who does not know what to believe. Few things are more needed today than clear and intelligent teaching about the future life. This is an urgent task for the Church in the modern world.

(8) The Church is at once *holy*—a sanctified and sanctifying community, separated and set apart—and *catholic*, universal, inclusive. Both aspects are essential.

The Church is in the world as the servant of Christ crucified, to exhibit to the world the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, as a community in which love and peace are (actually though imperfectly) realized. It avails little to work out an admirable doctrine of the Atonement, unless the theology of *Christus Victor* be embodied and expressed in the Church's common life.

Protestant Christianity has, on the whole, kept the sacred and the



secular apart. But Christianity means the redemption of the secular, the method of the Incarnation, the Divine in the flesh, being exhibited in the actuality of ordinary life, daily work, the structure and ordering of society. It has been a disaster that Christianity in the past has concentrated on the sanctification of the individual soul, making religion a department of life. It is a fatal tendency of our time that life is cut up into departments. The modern man defines freedom as "non-interference with ME." Art and most other things, including religion, become the affair of specialists. "Is God the God of the Jew only? Yea, of the Gentile also"; yea, of secular activities also. Christianity may not shirk the difficult problems of the family or of property; it must bring those in to be sanctified through the free surrender of all life to God, *because* the method of the Incarnation, the way of Agape, is the manifestation of the Divine *in the flesh*.

To sum up: Christianity is Salvation, not of a part of man, but of the whole man;

Not Salvation from the flesh, but Salvation in the flesh;

Not of selected souls out of the world, but Salvation of the world;

And Christian faith involves the confidence that God is ultimately able to achieve a victory that is complete, in the whole redemption of God's creation to God.

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.

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## NOTES ON PERIODICALS

In the true fashion of our old quarterlies, in the October issue of the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, Father Galtier discusses in an article of fifty pages the methods of primitive penitence. He has much to say about the silence of antiquity on this matter, and he has much more to say on the outstanding importance of St. Augustine, the great developer of institutionalism. Father Zeiller endeavours to see how far Montanism penetrated to Illyricum. The reviews attain their usual high standard of excellence. The list of magazine articles published throughout Europe is indispensable to all deeply attracted to the study of the past.

C. P. S. C.

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## REVIEWS

THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND. I. THE ENGLISH SCHISM—HENRY VIII. (1509-1547). By G. Constant. Translated by R. E. Scantlebury. Sheed and Ward. 16s.

This book, witnessing to the continued French interest in the English Reformation, is of exceptional value. In modern days, Duchesne, Bémont, Trésal have, by their works, made it clear that the English Church excites great interest abroad: but this work of M. Constant, the well-known historian who is Professor at the Institut Catholique in Paris, surpasses all previous efforts. It represents historical study at its best; the controversial tone is absent; the author's reading has been exhaustive; the book is very well documented with excellent bibliographies and appendices; and the translation has been well done, while, at the same time, the opportunity has been taken to make some additions.

It is a careful study. M. Constant makes it clear in his opening chapter that the causes of the Reformation are to be found much further back than the divorce. "Henry VIII.'s schism was but an episode in the eternal conflict between Church and State, and in England this conflict was not new." Papal authority in England had declined to such an extent that its thunders were no longer able to shake the English nation. Nor was indifference to the Papacy confined to England. Catholic princes on the Continent were quite apathetic to the religious issues involved. Such candour, to which we are not too accustomed in England, marks a real step forward and can do nothing but good, for any understanding seems impossible when obvious historical facts are ignored. Quite apart from the divorce a Reformation was inevitable, but the divorce was important "not that it was one of the causes in itself, but that by converting into enmity a former friendship it alienated from Rome the only power capable of keeping together the forces that were working against the Church and tending to rend it asunder."

The divorce is always unpleasant reading—from any point of view. Neither Pope nor King came out of it with credit. M. Constant maintains that the instances of other annulments of marriage which are often quoted as parallels are not analogous. Clement VII.'s actions, it is maintained, were in perfect conformity with the law, and it is not admitted that the Pope was merely a tool in the hands of others, or that political reasons were behind the whole business.



We might believe that finally the Pope came down on the side of right, but even after reading the documents again, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that seven years is a longish period in which to come to a decision—that it was shameful to try to persuade the queen to enter a convent—that the Pope was influenced by political considerations, for when the secret commission was given to Knight, the ambassadors were asked not to make use of it until the French troops should be near Rome. When it seemed clear that Spanish influence in Italy was declining, Campeggio set out for England: but again, when the French were checked through the desertion of Doria and the death of Lautrec, Campeggio received new instructions: "Since the emperor is victorious, the Pope ought not to give him any pretext for a new rupture lest the Church be entirely destroyed."

The truth is, probably, that while the Pope shilly-shallied, bigger forces than Henry's passion for Anne Boleyn, or even his love of power, were at work. The whole question of the relation of a provincial Church to the papacy had been raised, coupled with a severe criticism of the papal claims. These things did not depend upon Henry's passions, nor were they settled by them. The appeal to the Universities, even if it were a political expediency, was a big thing in principle, being an appeal from a mechanical authority to the appeal of sound learning, and that lies at the root of the English Reformation.

Prof. Constant's conclusion is that with the death of Henry VIII., the schismatic and orthodox Church of England was destined to disappear. This simple sentence raises great questions which cannot be dealt with here.

Written from the Roman Catholic point of view, this book is admirable, and we shall look forward to the second volume, two chapters of which have already appeared in French.

H. A. MORETON.

THE IDEA OF PERFECTION IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: An Historical Study of the Christian Ideal for the Present Life. By R. Newton Flew, D.D. Oxford University Press. 15s.

In this exhaustive and (to tell the truth) rather exhausting work Dr. Flew sets out to give the answer to the question Need a Christian sin? For this purpose he leads the reader through the whole course of ascetic theology from the New Testament to Ritschl and Forsyth. The book is so packed with information, and attacks every relevant question so



boldly that it needs the printer's fine craftsmanship to enable the reader to persevere in traversing the maze. Dr. Flew's accumulation of digested learning is colossal, and his achievement deserves to be compared with that of Dr. Kirk in *The Vision of God*. "If only I could remember all this, what a lot I should know!" we are inclined to say after reading either of them. But, as we study such books—and any perusal of them must take the form of study if it is to be of much use—we do begin to get clues which are of permanent value in the task of estimating the main tendencies of Christian spirituality, Patristic, Catholic, and Protestant.

It cannot be said that the author supplies any solution of the ultimate antinomy presented by the fact that while we all know that we need not sin, we also know that everybody does. But the central thought of his book depends on his distinction between absolute and relative perfection. The former depends on the beatific vision and does not belong to this world at all. The latter is the regulative ideal of the Christian life. Holiness, depending on faith, and constituting such perfection as is congruous with any particular stage in spiritual growth, is possible in this world at any moment. How far this involves sinlessness the author seems to refuse to discuss; but his principal anxiety is to shew that the authentic Christian teaching sets up an ideal which on the one hand may be rightly called perfection, but on the other is quite definitely of this world and not an anticipation of the world to come. The compatibility of these two elements in the ideal he rests (perhaps rather artificially) on the apocalyptic character of our Lord's proclamation of the Kingdom of God. If such a kingdom were really imminent, it would follow that in this world the ideal life is possible. This is not affected by the fact that our Lord "seems to have believed that the end of the world was not far away" (Dr. Flew modifies this statement very considerably on p. 39). So to St. Paul, with his apocalyptic beliefs, the imminence of the Kingdom implies that relative perfection involving the end of the dominion of sin is the normal Christian ideal. The comparative absence from St. John of the apocalyptic element seems to the author a step towards the dehumanizing of the idea of perfection. "The cathedral calm of the Fourth Gospel is not so tense with life as the open-air preaching of the first three." The history of Christian thought for long exhibited a progressive dehumanization of this kind. The author traces the gradual appearance of the idea that the life of this world is necessarily sinful, of legalism and the teaching of works of supererogation, and of the emphasis on the passionless character of the Christian ideal,



until with Origen that ideal comes to be thought of as a turning of the back on all sensible things.

The direct result of this conception was Monasticism, "the boldest organized attempt to attain to Christian perfection in all the long history of the Church." Henceforward for many centuries Catholic theologians practically equate perfection with some form of flight from the world, even though in theory the possibilities of perfection extend through the whole realm of grace. It was reserved for St. Francis de Sales (though to some extent he was anticipated by his namesake of Assisi) to preach the possibility of "the devout life" to those living in the world. Since his time the contrast, to Catholic ascetic writers, has not been so much between the secular and the religious as between the beginner and the perfect.

Early Protestantism, in reaction against the idea of merit, tended to decry any language about the possibility of human perfection. To Calvinism, indeed, such a thing is not only impossible but irrelevant. The idea came back to Protestantism with the freer and less sectarian movements such as Quakerism and Methodism. It was given a place in systematic theology by Schleiermacher (perhaps with too much facility). It was freed from any flavour of other-worldliness by Ritschl: for to Protestant saintliness the ideal for this life is not an anticipation in any sense of the life to come, but consists in religious strength for victory over this world.

Dr. Flew is severe in criticism of Ritschl, his refusal of all metaphysics, his defective doctrine of sin and of grace and of communion with God; but his final "main conclusion" is perhaps as much influenced by Ritschl as by any other theologian: Christianity must be "preached as a Gospel of hope for this world as the next, as a Gospel that all things are possible to faith, because faith is set on a living God who has a purpose for us in this world and in the life beyond." "The seeking of an ideal that is realizable in this world is essential to Christianity."

K. D. MACKENZIE.

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A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH. Vol. I. By Philip Hughes. Sheed and Ward. 1934. 10s. 6d.

Mr. Philip Hughes has undertaken to write a history of the Christian Church in three volumes. This is the first, issued under the sub-title, "The Church and the World in which it was Founded." The author is a Roman Catholic, writing for Roman Catholics, with the object of vindicating the papal claims, especially against the Eastern Church. For example,



having sketched the rise of the episcopate with what appears to be acquaintance with Canon Streeter's work, or Gwatkin's, or Lightfoot's, Mr. Hughes can only account for the universality of mon-episcopacy at the beginning of the second century on the ground "that this was part of the Founder's plan wrought out in detail by the Apostles He had commissioned," and thereby lays himself open to the retort, "Then why do we not find mon-episcopacy universal fifty years earlier?" Again, whether the Roman claim can any longer receive support from the First Epistle of Clement and from the Ignatian Epistles may perhaps be arguable by scholars, although for many the negative conclusion is now fairly well grounded. Mr. Hughes has obviously been shaken by Professor Merrill's demolition of the Peter-Simon Magus myth, although he cannot quite surrender the pretty story, and he assigns to St. Peter twenty-five years of episcopal rule in Rome.

Cyprian is both praised and criticized. He is criticized, of course, because he did not complete his theory of the episcopate by recognizing the Bishop of Rome as head of the Universal Church. Schröckh long ago claimed Cyprian as a Protestant. No Protestant does that today, and no doubt Mr. Hughes is right when he says, "St. Cyprian, it is not hard to understand why, has been chosen patron of the modern sects whose ideal is a Catholicism without the Roman Primacy"—Anglicans, of course, being one of "the modern sects." Truly a sneer is often but a thin shell surrounding the hard nut of truth; it often veils a confession of what is true.

Some of the best historical writing in this well-written book is to be found in the able chapter on the Arian dispute, but the account is vitiated by some straining of facts in order to substantiate the early recognition of the Roman Primacy. No doubt the Roman Church comes very well out of the story, save for the lapse of Liberius, which, in spite of Gwatkin, Mr. Hughes attempts to explain away, but even our author has to admit that the Eastern Church coupled the name of Peter, Bishop of Alexandria, with that of the pontiff Damasus as the guardian of its faith.

Again, Mr. Hughes is on safe ground in claiming that Ambrose, following Hilary, clearly defined the independence of the Christian bishop in relation to the State, but when he suggests that "thanks especially to St. Ambrose . . . a clearer appreciation of the rôle of the Roman Primacy" was established in the relation between Church and State, we perceive the *arrière pensée*. What Ambrose contends is that the bishop personifies Christ, not the Pope. It is also questionable whether Basil of Cæsarea had the interests of Rome equally strongly at heart,



for, on the evidence supplied by Mr. Hughes, Basil appears to be lecturing the Roman bishop on the affair of Meletius of Antioch.

The third canon issued by the Council of Constantinople of 381 awards to the Bishop of Constantinople "the primacy of honour after the Bishop of Rome because Constantinople is New Rome." This is criticized on the ground that it wrecks the constitution of the Eastern Church set up in the second canon, which recognizes "five autonomous, self-contained groups," based on the five civil dioceses of the Empire. But if you attack the third canon of Constantinople, you must also attack the twenty-eighth of Chalcedon, and this is what Mr. Hughes does. "The Council had once more, following the unhappy precedent of 381, set itself to heighten the prestige of the see where now the imperial capital was established. To the famous 'primacy of honour,' voted Constantinople in 381, Chalcedon recognizes considerable extensions. By its ninth, seventeenth and twenty-eighth canons the Council gave legal consecration to all the jurisdictions which had accrued to Constantinople since 381, through the illegal usurpations of its bishops. The bishops of Constantinople had for seventy years been the spiritual pirates of the Eastern Church. One after another the different metropolitan sees had seen their rights of jurisdiction invaded and captured. Now Chalcedon ratified all that had been done, blessed the spoiler, and gave him for the future the right to spoil as he would" (p. 318). Now every reader knows that there were scandals in the episcopal history of Constantinople during the fourth and fifth centuries. Have there never been scandals in the episcopal history of Rome? If so, why is Constantinople charged with piracy, and a halo of pious prelacy reserved for the Western patriarchate?

The real cause of Mr. Hughes' strong prose appears on the next page—"The Council grants to the see of Constantinople the right to ordain the metropolitans of the civil dioceses of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace, and of all the missionary bishops depending on them." Commenting on this pronouncement, Mr. Hughes continues, "Constantinople is to be in these regions what Alexandria is in Egypt, what Rome is in the West, the effective supervisor of all the other sees." But why not, although it may be awkward for Ultramontane writers that not one of the first four General Councils assigned to the Bishop of Rome in such express terms the authority here granted by the Fifth Ecumenical Council to the Patriarch of Constantinople. On two occasions (pp. 326 and 353), indeed, the author pays a tribute to the services rendered by the Bishop of Constantinople to the Catholicity of the Eastern Church, but his parting word



will surely be read with amusement, "Legend, finally, forged for the see a pedigree of apostolicity. The first Bishop of Constantinople was St. Andrew." Has legend played no part in setting up the Roman claims, and was St. Peter, whom we may allow to have been martyred near Rome, its first bishop?

It is regrettable that this ably written book presents a sustained attempt to undermine, in the eyes of Christendom, the authority of the patriarchates of the Orthodox Eastern Church. Moreover, realizing that none the less the Orthodox Church gave us the Creed at Nicæa, Constantinople, Ephesus and Chalcedon, our author is ready to abandon the authority even of the Creed, on the ground that the West recognizes "in loyalty to his (the Bishop of Rome's) teaching *rather than to the password of any council, however sacred, the touchstone of true faith and membership* (p. 265).

We have italicized these words because of their significance and tendency, which become quite clear later on. "In the East, whether the bishops are Catholic or heretic, saints or courtiers, the Emperor's good pleasure is the final authority. Rome, whatever the civil prestige of the city, remains witness of herself, and to Rome's primacy even the state-ridden churches of the East ultimately bow rather than lose that communion which is hers uniquely." This statement is no mere comment on Church History in the seven centuries covered by this book, it is a pronouncement on the attitude of Rome to the Eastern Church in all succeeding ages.

Mr. Hughes puts his finger on a true cause of trouble when he traces the baneful influence of Cæsaro-papalism in the Eastern Church. But he fails to observe that if the Bishop of Rome had striven to assist the Patriarch of Constantinople in developing a spiritual authority similar to that secured by the Roman Bishop in the West, Cæsaro-papalism might never have become a dangerous influence in the East. Moreover, he overlooks the fact that the story of the rise of the Roman Primacy in the fifth century would have been very different if the line of the West Roman Emperors had contained as many able and strong-minded potentates as the line of contemporary Emperors in the East.

But a review of this able book should not close on a note of criticism. It is worthy of the attention of all students of Church History. It is the best book on Church History done by a Roman Catholic, writing in English, for many a year. Down to the Arian controversy, the larger half of Mr. Hughes' story presents delightfully fresh treatment. In the chapter entitled "The Founder" he rises to the height of the finest devotional writing, and to read it is a spiritual inspiration. The accounts



of Gnosticism, Montanism, Monarchianism are free from wearisome details, although he does not sufficiently contrast the teaching of Paul of Samosata and Sabellius. Interspersed in a more helpful manner than most textbooks offer, are accounts of the Apologists, of Irenæus, and Tertullian, and of the School of Alexandria. Perhaps one of the most useful parts of the book for the general student is the last chapter on "The Traditional Faith and Imperial Policy," covering the reign of Justinian, the Sixth General Council and the Council *In Trullo*, and bringing the story down to 711. This period is not generally available for English readers.

A. J. MACDONALD.

## NOTICES

THE IMMORTAL GARLAND. A Book of Women Saints. By Georgina Home. Mowbray. 5s.

Before the Great War most people thought that the millennium was, if not in sight, at least just round the corner, and that the united efforts of Democracy, higher education, native self-government, Boy Scouts, summer schools, round-table conferences, women's institutes, and so forth, would turn the world into a paradise of peace, plenty and enlightenment within the next hundred years. Now there seems to be an idea that a generation of saints will do more than anything to teach the world what kind of paradise is worth striving after.

So there has arisen a new interest in saints and in saintliness; and men and women want to know whether a saint is an anachronism, or whether his life and his ideals can be reproduced in the present century.

This book is not a psychological study, nor does it undertake to defend the beliefs or the motives of the Christian saints. It is a collection of simply written tales of holy women, from St. Blandine, who was martyred in A.D. 177, to little St. Thérèse of Lisieux, who died in 1897.

Saintliness was not the prerogative of any age or nation, class or profession. These women seem to have had no common characteristic, except their love for God. It is impossible to estimate the good that they did, but their beneficent influence on the external as well as on the spiritual life of their times was enormous.

Perhaps this modest volume may sow the seeds of more flowers for the immortal garland—as it was said of the saints, "plaiting one crown of different colours and of all kinds of flowers, they offered it to the Father."

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.



WOMEN AND THE LITURGICAL MINISTRY. By Kenneth D. Mackenzie, Canon of Salisbury. Mowbray. 1s. 6d.

What an admirable thing is the judicial mind! The author of this scholarly little book holds very strong views on the question of the Ministry of Women. He is, however, so anxious that justice should be done, that he states the case against his own opinion quite as convincingly as the case for it. In fact, the reader would find himself agreeing first on one side and then on the other with donnish indecision, did he not finally reach a summary of conclusions, and draw a long breath of relief at having escaped from the conflicting winds of various theories and practices.

It is quite clear that the priesthood could not be given to women without an insuperable barrier being raised against Christian reunion. This is the fact that must be kept in mind when all the further considerations, such as woman's natural devoutness, her position in modern society, and so forth, are allowed their full importance. Women, when they beg for extended powers, must remember that a United Christendom could not recognize them.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

JOHN WESLEY AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. By W. J. Sparrow Simpson, D.D. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

Although small in compass, this book appears to say all that is necessary on this important topic, and while being concise it is interesting and easy to read. It is a masterly achievement. John Wesley is allowed to speak freely on his own behalf (and what a convincing manner of speaking he has), while Charles is occasionally called in as a witness. Dr. Sparrow Simpson's presentation of the case is sympathetic, just and conclusive.

It is evident enough that, when speaking for himself, John never wavered in his determination to live and die within the fold of the Church, and in this he was at one with Charles. When speaking for the Methodist Fellowship, however, he was not certain of his position. His uncertainty led to inconsistency and caused division between himself and his brother. Referring to the first step taken to separate the Methodist Fellowship from the Church, Charles said: "I have lived on earth a little too long, who have lived to see this evil day." In his heart John always desired that his Society should remain within the Church and receive the sacraments, even though for opportunity to preach its lay-preachers always had to go outside the walls of the Church. The admission of large numbers of nonconformists to the Society must have weakened the bond linking the Society as a whole to the Church, but this new factor in the situation does not seem to have concerned John at all. His single dilemma was this: Could he advocate continuance within the Church if that should come to mean disloyalty to the Methodist cause? or, Should he not rather condone separation if loyalty to the cause made it inevitable? Charles could not contemplate the possibility that separation from the Church might be for the good of the cause.

Dr. Sparrow Simpson diagnoses regretfully the spiritual condition of the Church as critically anæmic, but points out that, had the legal and official restrictions not so rigidly compelled the sick Church to stay in doors, the fresh air from the larger world overseas might have brought



new health and vigour. The refusal of the English Church to consecrate Dr. Seabury as Bishop for America doubtless influenced John to consider seriously the authorising of Dr. Coke for superintendency over the Methodist Society in America. The authorization was at last given, and given by the laying on of hands. And on the theory of Presbyterian Succession held by Wesley, it followed that since Dr. Coke was already a priest, this further authorization made him a priest with oversight of a province, or (since it was merely a matter of word) a Bishop.

One point of considerable importance in this connection is not clear. (It is the only point in the book that is not made perfectly clear.) Had Dr. Seabury already been consecrated by the Scottish Church when Dr. Coke was authorized by John Wesley, and did John know at the time that the consecration had taken place and that Seabury was Bishop of America by Episcopal Ordination? or, did John know that within a short time Seabury would be ordained? The ordination of Seabury and the authorization of Coke took place in the same year. The authorization was given at the end of August or beginning of September, 1784; in which month was Seabury consecrated? If Wesley knew that Seabury had been refused ordination as Bishop for America by the English Church but knew no more, his action in authorizing Coke is understandable and, in a large measure, excusable, although it may still be deplorable. If, however, he knew that Seabury had been consecrated or was likely to be consecrated by the Scottish Church, then the authorization of Coke takes on an entirely different colour.

After the death of Wesley the new society made little or no attempt to keep in touch with the Church. To the later Wesleyan Methodists it has always seemed that the dilemma contemplated by Wesley was forced upon their society, and that their complete separation received approval from John in his latest years.

The book ends with a chapter on the prospects of reunion. The conditions within the Church have so greatly changed that Methodism would no longer be faced with the dilemma that seemed to justify separation. If the belief in unity and the desire for unity are strong enough, the two obstacles in the way of reunion may be overcome; one is Wesley's belief in Presbyterian Ordination, the other, the setting up of Wesley's sermons and notes on the New Testament as an independent standard of orthodoxy. In spite of these impediments, "a great movement which originated within the English Church, and whose motive was to revive the religious condition of that Church, can surely not be intended to complete its destiny outside the Communion in which it had its birth."

A few printer's errors might have been corrected in the proof-reading: p. 69, l. 9 up, read *than* for *that*; on p. 71, l. 6 up, should not the quotation marks be inserted a line lower down? On p. 86, l. 15 up, the verb *was* has been omitted and on the next line read *seemed* for *seem*; on p. 91, the sentence beginning l. 8 down has gone wrong somewhere.

This is a book that will make for better understanding and closer fellowship between Anglicans and Wesleyans.

CYRIL H. VALENTINE.



PILLARS OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH. Broadcast Address on Eminent Churchmen. By Canon Deane, the Master of the Temple, Canon Raven and Prebendary Mackay. Mowbray. 4s. 6d.

"Pillars of the English Church!" says the man outside. "H'm! Some High, some Low, some Broad—no wonder the Church is such a funny shape."

The Church of England may remind him of a description of Harthover Place, as given in *The Water Babies*, by Charles Kingsley. "Harthover Place had been built at ninety different times, in nineteen different styles, and looked as if somebody had built a whole street of houses of every imaginable shape and then stirred them together with a spoon."

But when antiquarians told Sir John Harthover that his house lacked unity, the old gentleman replied that this was just why he loved it. He liked to see how each Sir John and Sir Hugh, Sir Ralph and Sir Randal, had set his mark upon the place.

So in this book you may read how "scribes" and "rulers," "prophets" and "parish priests," set their mark upon the Church of England. Jeremy Taylor, whose portrait hangs in the hall of his old college at Cambridge, writes some of the finest, most moving prose in the English language; George Crabbe, who could evoke a landscape and paint a portrait in rhymed couplets, and who loved the poor at a time when Duchesses thought the lower classes had inferior and disgusting souls; Charles Gore, who successfully combined mutually exclusive virtues and beliefs; Frederick Denison Maurice, that wonderful blend of saintliness and practical enthusiasm for social reform; Charles Kingsley, whose genius his own countrymen do not yet fully appreciate, and who was entirely unaware of his own greatness, though extremely tenacious of his own opinions—sixteen men altogether, and every one of them lovable.

Readers of this book, and they will be many, must not forget that the men who delivered the broadcast addresses are also Pillars of the Church. "Pillar," perhaps, would seem an odd designation for Canon Raven, who is all fire and nerves. And the Master of the Temple, too—a young friend of mine happened to meet him at an At Home in London, looking rather lost. She thought he was probably some stray clergyman up from the country, and amiably engaged him in conversation without waiting for an introduction. Finding him intelligent and remarkably well-informed, she ventured to ask whether he lived in London, whether, indeed, he—— So Dr. Carpenter modestly owned up. Possibly so modest a man might prefer to be a Back Seat rather than a Pillar. Both are useful. But this is in parenthesis.

In conclusion then, my friends, let us return to our quotation from Kingsley. "Another was bold enough to tell him that his house was ugly, but he said that he lived inside it."

Critics of the Church, please note. The best view of the sacred building is certainly obtained from the inside.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

ELEMENTAL RELIGION. By L. P. Jacks. Williams and Norgate. 4s. 6d.

To his six Lyman Beecher Lectures on preaching Dr. Jacks has added the "Three Sermons on the Main Topic," which he preached in Liverpool Cathedral. The result is a book which neither criticizes Christianity nor



advertises Unitarianism, but presents in a deeply religious spirit some of the things which belong to the essence of faith in God. The preacher will find no help in the art of preaching; the Christian must feel that the truth here set forth is severely limited, in spite of the absence of negations; the Churchman will find nothing in all the writer's obvious wisdom and piety to make him change his opinion that it was a regrettable breach of order to invite a Unitarian to occupy the pulpit of a cathedral church. But all who read this book will be compelled to acknowledge the convincing sincerity with which the preacher and the man in the pew are exhorted to live with God and to have done with the shams and superficialities which sometimes pass for religion.

O. HARDMAN.

MAN AND DEITY. AN OUTLINE OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION, WITH EXTRACTS FROM SACRED BOOKS. By A. C. Bouquet, D.D. W. Heffer and Sons. 7s. 6d.

Though this book possesses independent value as a good descriptive account of the various systems of religion, omitting Judaism and Christianity, it belongs to a series of seven volumes written by Dr. Bouquet to serve as "Modern Handbooks on Religion," and it ought to be judged in the light of the contribution it makes to the author's complete scheme. That is probably how it will come to be estimated by most of its readers, for it may be expected that they will be so well satisfied with the competence of the writer that they will be eager to acquire the other volumes of the series. It is not only that he is well acquainted with the most recent literature and able to present his material in a concise and readable form—the book altogether avoids the dry text-book manner—but that there is a large background to the writing, a thoroughly modern outlook, a marked sincerity of purpose, and a careful exercise of unprejudiced and wise judgment. The only lapse in this last respect occurs on p. 233, where Dr. Bouquet has written a most misleading paragraph about the place of women in the Buddhist and the Christian religions respectively. This mars an otherwise conspicuously fair account of Buddhism from the Christian standpoint, in which justice is done to both religions.

*Buddhism* does not appear in the index; nor does *Sikhism*, though a brief account of it will be found on pp. 216 ff. *Caste* is also missing, and is not explained in the text, though the word is used on p. 178 and again on p. 185.

O. HARDMAN.

THE MOFFATT NEW TESTAMENT COMMENTARY: GALATIANS. By the Rev. G. S. Duncan. Hodder and Stoughton. 8s. 6d. net.

We can unreservedly congratulate Dr. Moffatt and Dr. Duncan on the latest addition to the series of commentaries on the books of the New Testament. Dr. Duncan has succeeded in producing a really scholarly commentary, which is at the same time not too technical or advanced for the ordinary student, who has no Greek and wants to know what St. Paul really meant without having to read every theory as to his meaning which may ever have been put forward. In this commentary he will find a plain and straightforward interpretation of the Apostle's meaning; and he will



find one which is before everything else concerned with [the religious values of the Epistle and the religious issues which were at stake. Dr. Duncan is at any rate largely sympathetic with the theology of Karl Barth, which makes him an admirable exponent of this highly Barthian epistle; it is all the more creditable that he realizes how much there was to be said for St. Paul's opponents. There are, of course, numerous points on which I should quarrel with him: I am quite clear that when St. Paul writes of "justification" he means being made righteous by a sudden conversion. Dr. Duncan, interpreting it as "counting righteous," is here in the same difficulty as St. Paul found himself later, when he had to justify the use of rules, while condemning legalism. I do not think he allows enough for the fact that St. Paul, in dealing with the Gentiles, was primarily conscious of the fact that circumcision had to go, and then proceeded to find reasons to justify it. But then Dr. Duncan will reply that I am at heart a Pelagian, not a thoroughgoing Pauline, and he will be right.

On minor points I would urge that the question of Jews and Gentiles eating together is not seriously concerned with the ordinary round of social intercourse. It is always first and foremost a question of the Lord's Table—i.e., Eucharist and Agape, as a joint rite—that matters. After all, a little tact could avoid joint meals of a social character, but separate eucharists mean a system of caste in the Church. Dr. Duncan, of course, recognizes that the Lord's Table is largely concerned; but I think he allows to the question of general social intercourse an importance which it does not possess; it must be borne in mind that the Agape and Eucharist together formed the specifically Christian act of worship in the Gentile communities. Another point I would urge is that when St. Paul accuses St. Peter of "living like a Gentile," or his opponents of "not keeping the Law," he writes as a Pharisee who regards the popular level of Judaism represented by the Galilean disciples of the Lord as no better than heathenism; it is the regular attitude of the extremist as towards the moderate.

But these criticisms must not be taken to detract from my admiration for a difficult piece of work, excellently carried out. It is no slight thing to write a commentary on Galatians; it inevitably challenges comparison with Lightfoot's masterpiece. Dr. Duncan has done a real service to the study of the New Testament, both by his excellent explanation of the history which lies behind Galatians (an admirable piece of work, with which I entirely agree) and in his exposition of the meaning of the Epistle and its religious value.

WILFRED L. KNOX.

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THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY. By Oscar Hardman, M.A., D.D.  
S.P.C.K. 2s. 6d.

In these, the White Lectures for 1933, Dr. Hardman shews that modernity rejects the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, because of the obvious impossibility of its common presentation. He shews that the modernist attempts to substitute a doctrine of a "spiritual body" are not essentially different from simple belief in the immortality of the soul, and are unsatisfactory because this not only means a complete break with tradition, but robs our Saviour's words "It is finished" of their



triumph. The empty tomb declares that the body of Jesus has been translated and is therefore the assurance that all creation will be translated. So belief in the Resurrection of the Body makes it possible to apprehend the glorious possibilities that are to be realized by the transformation of the material order, and to enjoy and to use the things of this world accordingly. The doctrine is necessary, since "it is true as a symbolic expression of belief in the ultimate consummation of the redemptive process which is at work in Creation, and also as a representative formulation of that belief, expressing a truth about a specific part of the physical order which is applicable to the whole of that order."

NOEL DAVEY.

THE BEGINNINGS OF OUR RELIGION. By F. James, C. B. Hedrick, B. S. Easton, and F. C. Grant. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF JESUS CHRIST. Vol. I. By Jules Lebreton, S.J. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 10s. 6d.

*The Beginnings of our Religion* is the work of four American scholars of the Episcopal Church. It is an excellent introduction to the study of the Bible, and ought to prove useful both to the general reader and to study circles. The first four chapters on the religion of the Old Testament from the time of Moses onwards are not quite so good as those that follow. The early history of the Hebrews is sketched with a degree of assurance that the available evidence can hardly be held to justify. But if a conservative bias is noticeable here, it is absent from the rest of the book. The chapters by Dr. F. C. Grant on "Early Judaism,"—i.e., on the Judaism which formed the immediate background of the New Testament—and on "Our Lord" are models of compressed learning, clear exposition and objective judgment. The same may be said of Mr. Hedrick's chapters on the Christianity of St. Paul and of St. John. There is no attempt to make the Bible prove what the Church teaches, and yet ample justification is provided for the following statement of one of the writers: "Even though it come to pass that some may find necessary a revision of their inherited views of the Old and New Testament history, we nevertheless believe there is firmer ground beneath our feet as a result of the modern historical study of Christian origins" (p. 92). This admirable little book might profitably be put into the hands of those who suppose or complain that the results of the literary and historical criticism of the Bible are negative in form and destructive in effect.

Père Lebreton is Professor of Sacred Scripture at the Institut Catholique in Paris; his *The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ*, which is based on his lectures there, has been translated into English by the Rev. Francis Day. The book shews what kind of teaching about the earthly life of our Lord is given by one of the most learned and temperate of Roman Catholic scholars. His work is evidently the outcome of wide reading, prolonged study, and deep personal devotion. The full historicity of all four Gospels is, of course, assumed; and where there are apparent divergencies, they have to be harmonized. Thus, commenting on the difference between the Matthæan and Lucan introductions to the Sermon on the Mount, Père Lebreton remarks: "We may easily suppose that having first ascended the mountain, Jesus then came half-way down again on to one of those grassy terraces that are so numerous on the side of the Galilean



hills" (p. 124). The extent to which the author's conclusions are conditioned by dogmatic prepossessions is suggested by the following passage: "Mary, the Mother of Jesus, remained always a virgin, and those who are called 'The Lord's brethren' were not Mary's children. This is a dogma of Faith for every Catholic and is also the conclusion to which Scripture, illuminated by tradition, inevitably leads. This belief rests on the Annunciation narrative and especially on our Lady's reply: "How shall this be done, because I know not a man?" The question thus put implies Mary's intention of remaining always a virgin, at whatever cost, preferring virginity even to the honour that the angel placed within her grasp" (pp. 31 f.).

A. R. VIDLER, O.G.S.

**THE IDEALS OF EAST AND WEST.** By K. Saunders. Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.

The student of comparative religion will find in this book much that is useful for his purpose. The author points out that "a double process is always at work," and that great teachers use the popular ideals which grow up among the common people and give them back to the people "sublimated and purified" (Preface). Such a consideration helps us in the study of the Old Testament. The ethical systems of India, China, Japan, Greece, Palestine, and Christendom are discussed, and illustrated by an anthology from the literature of each.

Dr. Saunders' appreciation of the Greek contribution to ethics is well balanced, and he rightly says that "Aristotle himself is far grander than his ideal" [of the great gentleman], and goes on to refer to his "architectonic genius" as philosopher and man of science (p. 132). One might add that in the *Ethics* itself can be found a higher ideal of morality than that of the mere "high-minded man" (see *Eth. Nic.* X. vii. 8).

In the section on India, Mahatma Gandhi is given his true place among the prophets. A really important question is asked here: "Can India retain her gentleness and add energy, preserve her devotion to God in serving men, practise detachment in acquiring zeal? If so, she can help to cure us of the worship of the machine, and can work out with us a more humane order of society" (p. 25). The Christian will see here an answer which the writer would hardly accept.

For it is probable that the Unitarian and Theosophist will be able to give the book a more whole-hearted welcome than can those of us who hold its estimate of Jesus to be false; who believe that the tendency to relegate our Lord to the level of other great world-teachers is the most subtly dangerous with which in these days we have to cope. Subtly, because, as always in such books, there are many passages that might have been written by a Churchman. Good points are made; the clash between the two warring ideals in the Church is well summed up: "'Caesaro-Papism' is . . . a mistaken form of theocracy. . . . The schisms which rend the Body of Christ are an exaggerated expression of the inalienable right of private judgment" (p. 222). But side by side with such sound criticism we have almost scornful dismissal of essential elements of our faith; there are the usual references to it as having "won the ancient world largely as a mystery-religion" (p. 204); to Gautama Buddha as being to the East what Christ is to the West (Preface). "An urgent yet difficult task of criticism," it is stated (p. 205), "is to dis-



tinguish between his [Christ's] own thought about himself and that of the Church which produced the theological tracts known as the Four Gospels." Difficult indeed; for if the gospels are only theological tracts, we know nothing whatever about Jesus except that He died as a criminal. It is interesting to note that all four gospels are here regarded as Church documents, and not (as of old) merely the fourth.

It is true that at times the writer acclaims Christ as too complex to fit into a category, and the Christian religion as something more than an ethical system; but we cannot allow that the Beatitudes or any other passages can be called "the heart of Christianity." The Christian ethic is wholly centred in the Person of our Lord, and has been proved historically to depend upon a definite doctrine about Him; for it is a fact that wherever the Church's teaching is abandoned, Christian morality has always followed hard in its wake. Christianity is Christ, and the heart of it is the Cross.

H. G. BLOMFIELD.

**MEDIAEVAL RELIGION (FORWOOD LECTURES, 1934) AND OTHER ESSAYS.**

By Christopher Dawson. Sheed and Ward. 6s.

The main part of Mr. Christopher Dawson's book consists of four lectures on Religion and Mediaeval Culture which he delivered at the University of Liverpool during the early part of 1934. As Mr. Dawson remarks, the study of mediaeval religion is of vital importance, not only for all who are desirous of knowing something of the history of Christianity, but also for those who want to know something of the history of Europe. Neither the religious nor the secular problems of to-day can be rightly understood apart from a grasp of that long process of development which is called the Middle Ages. The break in the continuity of the European tradition which happened in the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation was by no means as complete as those who brought it about supposed. What the sixteenth-century reaction against the Middle Ages did was not to wipe out the debt which we to-day owe to that period, but to set up an artificial barrier between the European mind and the culture and religion of the mediaeval world, and to make the appreciation of that culture and religion for a very long time impossible.

In order to understand the religion of the Middle Ages, some knowledge of contemporary culture is essential, for religion and civilization were so conjoined that religious institutions were the chief organs of culture, and there was hardly any form of social activity that did not have a religious sanction. The sociological foundation on which the mediaeval religious development rested is the subject of Mr. Dawson's first essay. The second deals with the religious development itself. The author finds the movement that had the greatest influence on mediaeval religion and culture in that new type of Christian experience which had made its appearance with St. Bernard, but found its highest expression in St. Francis of Assisi—the passionate devotion to the Humanity of Christ. The third and fourth essays treat respectively of mediaeval science and mediaeval literature. Finally, this intensely interesting book concludes with two additional *Aufsätze*, "The Origins of the Romantic Tradition" and "The Vision of Piers Plowman." Mr. Dawson has given us a fascinating collection of essays, which his publishers have presented in the attractive style which they have led us to expect in their books.

H. S. Box.



## BOOK NOTES

*The Epistles and Gospels.* By T. F. Royds. Blackwell. 2s. 6d. A new translation, made with skill and judgment, avoiding the excessive modernizing of some recent versions in view of its liturgical purpose. The admirable work of the 1928 Prayer Book in tacitly correcting mistranslations in the Epistles and Gospels has had scant justice done to it. However, its existence goes to shew that the Authorized Version is not regarded as sacrosanct. Those who feel at liberty, and are willing, to experiment are recommended to consult Mr. Royd's book.

*Communism and Religion.* By Ivor Thomas. Faith Press. 1s. This is a useful summary of the present position of religion in Russia, shewing that Communism is not identical with Marxism and need not involve the suppression of religion. The author argues that Communism, which is essentially equal distribution of goods, "is the form of social organization most compatible with the spirit of Christianity," pointing to monasticism. He does not shew why the community should disregard services rendered to the community, or the varying needs of its members. A monastery, in which a body of like-minded celibates voluntarily submit themselves to discipline, is an imperfect parallel.

*The Church and the Stage.* By Donald Hole. Faith Press. 2s. 6d. The beginning part of this history of the Actors' Church Union is poignantly interesting and reveals the terrible mistakes made by Christian public opinion in its judgment of the stage. What follows is primarily of domestic interest, since it tells of the inner history of the organization.

*Old Treasure.* By the Earl of Lytton. Allen and Unwin. 3s. 6d. An anthology of passages from the Bible, arranged under these heads—The God of Nature, The Nature of God, The Christian Year, The Quest of Wisdom, The Finding of Wisdom. The compiler in his Preface says that he has deliberately altered "fear of God" to "love of God" without indication of the change.

*Meditations on the Revelation of St. John.* By G. P. Trevelyan. Oxford University Press. 3s. 6d. Many students of the Bible feel that the Apocalypse, unsurpassed as it is in devotional value when used in selections, contains too much sub-Christian material to be profitable as a whole. Contrast its attitude towards the Roman Empire with that of St. Paul or the Epistle of St. Clement. Others, desiring to work through it devotionally, will be in safe hands as they study this book.

*The Vision of God*, by K. E. Kirk (7s. 6d.), and *God and the Astronomers*, by Dean Inge (5s.), are welcome reprints issued by Messrs. Longman at a low price.

*Old Testament History.* By G. W. Wade, D.D. Methuen. 10s. 6d. This admirable handbook was first published in 1901. The twelfth edition is now published, and the author has taken the opportunity to bring it up to date. The splendid trilogy of "Oesterley and Robinson" by no means supersedes Dr. Wade's book, which in shorter compass covers the ground of all three later works, with a method specially designed for students.

W. K. L. C.